April 3, 2007

When Mr Slobodan Milosevic died, I was probably one of the saddest individuals to receive the news of his death. Why? Because many of his victims failed to see justice delivered by convicting him for human rights catastrophy he caused in the Balkans. Mr Milosevic was charged with 66 counts of genocide and crimes against humanity. What were the chances that he would be acquitted on all counts? None!

Please note that key evidence proving Serbia’s direct responsibility for Srebrenica Genocide was withdrawn from the ICJ’s [International Court of Justice] proceedings in a case of Bosnia vs. Serbia. As Editor-in-chief of the NTV Hayat News network, Senad Hadzifejzovic, pointed out:

“Unfortunately, key arguments were not submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Hague at all! The most significant evidence clearly proving the intentions and aims of Serbia were the records of the sessions Milosevic held with the military and political leadership of Montenegro… these records were already in the Hague, but not in the premisses of the International Court of Justice, but ICTY where individuals have been put on trial. However, this evidence, according to the deal made between the ICTY and the government of Serbia MAY NOT BE USED for any other purposes except the stated ones, in particular not to be used in the case of Bosnia-herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro. So simply put, legal team of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not allowed at all to submit the crucial evidence to the Court of Justice at all!” (Interview February 24th, 2007).

Mr Milosevic and Serbia had direct hand in the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, Europe’s worst atrocity since World War II, according to a copy of an official Bosnian Serb document presented at ICTY (International Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia) in the case against Mr Milosevic. It had been widely assumed that by the summer of 1995 Serbia had cut off ties with the Bosnian Serb leadership and that the former’s forces had not taken part in the Srebrenica operation.

The document, dated July 10, 1995, is an order from Bosnian Serb minister of interior Tomislav Kovac instructing his subordinates to move a unit that included members of Serbia’s interior ministry police, MUP, which were fighting around Sarajevo, to eastern Bosnia to participate in the Srebrenica operation. Under the Serbian constitution, the president of Serbia, a post that Mr Milosevic held at the time, is directly responsible for the actions taken by his republic’s police force.

1. Click bellow to read revised (shortened) version in English language:

2. Click bellow to read original document (full version) in Serbian Language:

As pointed out in the Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh (One of ICJ Judges):

Serbia’s involvement, as a principal actor or accomplice, in the genocide that took place in Srebrenica is supported by massive and compelling evidence. Disagreement with the Court’s methodology for appreciating the facts and drawing inferences there from The Court should have required the Respondent to provide unedited copies of its Supreme Defence Council documents, failing which, the Court should have allowed a more liberal recourse to inference. The “effective control” test for attribution established in the Nicaragua case is not suitable to questions of State responsibility for international crimes committed with a common purpose. The “overall control” test for attribution established in the Tadić case is more appropriate when the commission of international crimes is the common objective of the controlling State and the non-State actors. The Court’s refusal to infer genocidal intent from a consistent pattern of conduct in Bosnia and Herzegovina is inconsistent with the established jurisprudence of the ICTY. The FRY’s knowledge of the genocide set to unfold in Srebrenica is clearly established. The Court should have treated the Scorpions as a de jure organ of the FRY. The statement by the Serbian Council of Ministers in response to the massacre of Muslim men by the Scorpions amounted to an admission of responsibility. The Court failed to appreciate the definitional complexity of the crime of genocide and to assess the facts before it accordingly.

More research:

  1. Anonymous
    April 4, 2007 at 1:00 pm

    “…this evidence, according to the deal made between the ICTY and the government of Serbia MAY NOT BE USED for any other purposes except the stated ones.”
    –I’m sorry, I must have dosed off. What were the purposes that were clearly evidenced?

    Also, what was the point of showing the order to COUNTERATTACK the OFFENSIVE from the SREBRENICA SAFE-HAVEN???? Won’t someone with an IQ of >80 ask about this more important questiont that would have percipitated the entire Srebrenica tragedy: why was their a Muslim attack originating from the Srebrenica safe-haven? If this is a fact, could any rational person be justified in picking fly shit out of pepper, i.e., ridiculing the Serbs for their transgretion if the Muslims broke the rules first, and in no small way?

    –VR, USA

  2. Owen
    April 4, 2007 at 8:54 pm

    Perhaps VR could explain why thousands of civilians were crammed into Srebrenica in the first place and on what sort of scale counter-attacks out of Srebrenica took place?

  3. Srebrenica Massacre
    April 5, 2007 at 12:36 am

    “V.R” is just one of many Serb apologists who uses cheap Serbian propaganda tricks.

    In fact, Serbs around Srebrenica NEVER honored their part of the demilitarization agreement! They used surrounding villages as their MILITARY COMPOUNDS and attacked Srebrenica on a daily basis! Here is what the United Nations’ General Assembly concluded, quote:

    475. Criticisms have also been leveled at the Bosniaks in Srebrenica, among them that they did not fully demilitarize and that they did not do enough to defend the enclave. To a degree, these criticisms appear to be contradictory.

    Concerning the first criticism, it is right to note that the Bosnian Government had entered into demilitarization agreements with the Bosnian Serbs. They did this with the encouragement of the United Nations. While it is also true that the Bosnian fighters in Srebrenica did not fully demilitarize, they did demilitarize enough for UNPROFOR to issue a press release, on 21 April 1993, saying that the process had been a success. Specific instructions from United Nations Headquarters in New York stated that UNPROFOF should not be too zealous in searching for Bosniak weapons and, later, that the Serbs should withdraw their heavy weapons before the Bosniaks gave up their weapons.

    The Serbs never did withdraw their heavy weapons.

    476. Concerning the accusation that the Bosniaks did not do enough to defend Srebrenica, military experts consulted in connection with this report were largely in agreement that the Bosniaks could not have defended Srebrenica for long in the face of a concerted attack supported by armour and artillery. The defenders were undisciplined, untrained, poorly armed, totally isolated force, lying prone in the crowded valley of Srebrenica. They were ill-equipped even to train themselves in the use of the few heavier weapons that had been smuggled to them by their authorities. After over three years of siege, the population was demoralized, afraid and often hungry. The only leader of stature was absent when the attack occurred. Surrounding them, controlling all the high ground, handsomely equipped with the heavy weapons and logistical train of the Yugoslav army, were the Bosnian Serbs. There was no contest.

    477. Despite the odds against them, the Bosniaks requested UNPROFOR to return to them the weapons they had surrendered under the demilitarization agreements of 1993. They requested those weapons at the beginning of the Serb offensive, but the request was rejected by the UNPROFOR because, as one commander explained, “it was our responsibility to defend the enclave, not theirs.”

    Given the limited number and poor quality of Bosniak weapons held by UNPROFOR, it seems unlikely that releasing those weapons to the Bosniaks would have made a significant difference to the outcome of the battle; but the Bosniaks were under attack at that time, they wanted to resist with whatever means they could muster, and UNPROFOR denied them access to some of their own weapons.

    With the benefit of hindsight, this decision seems to be particularly ill-advised, given UNPROFOR’s own unwillingness consistently to advocate force as a means deterring attacks on the enclave.

    478. Many have accused the Bosniak forces of withdrawing from the enclave as the Serb forces advanced on the day of its fall. However, it must be remembered that on the eve of the final Serb assault the Dutchbat commander urged the Bosniaks to withdraw from defensive positions south of Srebrenica town – the direction from which the Serbs were advancing. He did so because he believed that NATO aircraft
    would soon be launching widespread air strikes against the advancing Serbs.

    479. A third accusation leveled at the Bosniak defenders of Srebrenica is that they provoked the Serb offensive by attacking out of that safe area. Even though this accusation is often repeated by international sources, there is no credible evidence to support it. Dutchbat personnel on the ground at the time assessed that the few “raids” the Bosniaks mounted out of Srebrenica were of little or no military significance. These raids were often organized in order to gather food, as the Serbs had refused access for humanitarian convoys into the enclave. Even Serb sources approached in the context of this report acknowledged that the Bosniak forces in Srebrenica posed no significant military threat to them. The biggest attack the Bosniaks launched out of Srebrenica during the more than two years which is was designated a safe area appears to have been the raid on the village of Visnjica, on 26 June 1995, in which several houses were burned, up to four Serbs were killed and approximately 100 sheep were stolen. In contrast, the Serbs overran the enclave two weeks later, driving tens of thousands from their homes, and summarily executing thousands of men and boys. The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the raids out of Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to create geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the Drina, while freeing their troops to fight in other parts of the country. The extent to which this pretext was accepted at face value by international actors and observers reflected the prism of “moral equivalency” through which the conflict in Bosnia was viewed by too many for too long.

    For more, read here:


  4. Cj
    May 19, 2009 at 3:48 am

    After reading this story I felt pain and udder shock!
    This is horrible! I feel so sad for those poor people that endured this!
    I hope that any and all whom had a hand in this will be caught and punished!
    I will pray for the people that lived through this horror and I hope that they can find peace now from somewhere.
    This never should have happened!!!

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