srebrenica ghetto | Srebrenica Massacre

40,000 MUSLIMS TARGETED FOR EXTINCTION IN SREBRENICA, JUDGE T. MERON

August 20, 2009 Comments off

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“By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the forty thousand Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica… “ – Judge Theodor Meron [Polish-American Jew]

In 2004, Presiding U.N. Judge Theodor Meron – who is Polish-American of Jewish descent – delivered a historic speech at the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial located in Potocari (near Srebrenica). His speech was both moving and inspiring, but also educational. We hope you read it carefully and learn from it.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDING JUDGE THEODOR MERON

It is with honour and humility that I stand today at the Potocari Memorial Cemetery. This place is a daily reminder of the horrors that visited the town of Srebrenica during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The crimes committed there have been well documented and have been recognized – and roundly and appropriately condemned – by the United Nations, the international community in general, and by the people of the region of former Yugoslavia. These crimes have also been described in detail and consigned to infamy in the decisions rendered by the court over which I preside, the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia.

I have had a special wish to visit the Potocari Memorial Cemetery because earlier this year I had the privilege of sitting as the Presiding Judge in the appeal which, for the first time, judicially recognized the crimes committed against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995 as genocide. In that case, named Prosecutor versus Radislav Krstic, the Appeals Chamber of our Tribunal convicted one of the leaders of the Bosnian Serb assault on Srebrenica, General Radislav Krstic, for aiding and abetting genocide. The Appeals Chamber also found that some members of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army harboured genocidal intent against the Bosnian Muslim people who sought safety in the enclave of Srebrenica, and that these officials acted upon that intent to carry out a deliberate and massive massacre of the Muslims in Srebrenica.

The judgment which the Appeals Chamber has pronounced will be of importance not only in acknowledging the crime committed in Srebrenica for what it is, but also in developing and enhancing the international criminal law’s understanding of genocide. By discussing and elaborating the legal requirement of genocide, and by explaining how they applied it in the circumstances of Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber has facilitated the recognition – and, I hope, the prevention – of this horrible crime.

Many victims of this crime lie here, in this cemetery. In honour of their memory, I would like to read a brief passage from the judgment in Krstic, the passage which discusses the gravity and the horrific nature of the crime of genocide, and states unhesitantly that its perpetrators will unfailingly face justice.

“Among the grievous crimes this Tribunal has the duty to punish, the crime of genocide is singled out for special condemnation and opprobrium. The crime is horrific in its scope; its perpetrators identify entire human groups for extinction. Those who devise and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions provide. This is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt not only by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.

The gravity of genocide is reflected in the stringent requirements which must be satisfied before this conviction is imposed. These requirements – the demanding proof of specific intent and the showing that the group was targeted for destruction in its entirety or in substantial part – guard against a danger that convictions for this crime will be imposed lightly. Where these requirements are satisfied, however, the law must not shy away from referring to the crime committed by its proper name. By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the forty thousand Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed them solely on the basis of their identity. The Bosnian Serb forces were aware, when they embarked on this genocidal venture, that the harm they caused would continue to plague the Bosnian Muslims. The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper name: genocide. Those responsible will bear this stigma, and it will serve as a warning to those who may in future contemplate the commission of such a heinous act.”

Those who drafted, on the heels of the Second World War and the Holocaust, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide, were animated by the desire to ensure that the horror of a state-organized deliberate and massive murder of a group of people purely because of their identity will never recur in the history of humankind. The authors of the Convention hoped that by encapsulating the crime of genocide, by declaring unambiguously that it will not go unpunished, and by requiring the international community to do the utmost to prevent it, they will forestall forever attempts to annihilate any national, ethnic or religious group in the world. As the graves in this cemetery testify, the struggle to make the world free of genocide is not easy and is not one of uninterrupted victories. But I would like to think that by recognizing the crimes committed here as genocide, and by condemning them with the utmost force at our command, we have helped to make the hope of those who drafted the Genocide Convention into an expectation and perhaps even a reality. As I stand here today, I can do little better than to repeat the solemn warning sounded by the Appeals Chamber of our Tribunal that those who commit this inhumane crime will not escape justice before the courts of law and the court of history.

Finally, I take this opportunity to call, once again, for the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet their obligations under international law to cooperate fully with the ICTY. It is simply unacceptable that the authorities in the Republika Srpska have yet to arrest and transfer any individual on their territory who has been indicted by the Tribunal. This situation cannot be allowed to continue and I would like to see a dramatic change in the Republika Srpska’s level of compliance with its legal obligations. It is hightime that the RS break with its tradition of non-cooperation and obstruction of the Rule of Law.

In this regard, I take note of the findings in the Republika Srpska Srebrenica Commission’s preliminary report, which I see as a step in the right direction. It indicates a new readiness to come to terms with painful events of the past and to constrain revisionist tendencies. However, the process is far from complete.

SOURCE: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague, Netherlands http://www.icty.org/sid/8409.

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, genocide, judge theodor meron, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre, theodor meron

VICTIMS OF SERB TERROR AROUND SREBRENICA LAID TO REST

April 28, 2009 3 comments

34 BOSNIAN MUSLIM VICTIMS BURIED IN NEARBY VLASENICA

Flashback: What did Bosnian Serbs do in heavily militarized villages around Srebrenica from 1991-1995? They had participated in a number of brutal massacres against the Bosniak population in and around Srebrenica, including nearby municipality of Vlasenica.

On April 25th, 2009, thirty-four Bosniak victims were laid to rest in Vlasenica, at the Rakita cemeteray. Bodies of victims were found in mass graves around Srebrenica. Another fifteen victims are awaiting DNA identification.

The youngest victim was Almir Jahic who was 16 years old at the time of his death. His body was found in the mass grave along with the body of his father who was buried last year. The oldest victim was elderly Melka (Hase) Mekić (1912) who was 80 years old when Serbs from surrounding villages around Srebrenica attacked nearby Vlasenica municipality and killed her.

Among the victims in Rakita there are mother and daughter Almasa and Suada Hajdarevic and Salko and Mehmed Efendic who come from a family in which seven brothers and one cousin were murdered.

Serbs from heavily militarized villages around Srebrenica murdered 2.600 Bosnian Muslim civilians in Vlasenica municipality during the past war. Until now, 650 remains were exhumed and 350 bodies identified.

Serbian NGO “Women in Black” (photo on the left) came to pay their respect to the Bosniak victims of Serb terror around Srebrenica. Their representative, Staša Zajovič, said:

“We are going to Tuzla, Kozarac, Visegrad, to as many places as we possibly can, to places where Serbs committed crimes in our name, led by those who in the name of Serbhood, in the name of Greater Serbia, in the name of criminal politics, those who had committed such horrible brutalities. We express our human responsibility and a community act of solidarity with the victims of these crimes… We are disgusted with the current government in Serbia, as well as with the International community’s injustice toward the victims of this crime, which is one of countless crimes committed against the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially against the people of Bosniak nationality.”

Only Dragan Nikolic was convicted to 20 years of imprisonment for crimes in this town, while proceedings are ongoing against two more individuals. Other perpetrators are still free.

Here are NAMES of buried victims and FUNERAL PHOTOS:

Hajdarević (Derviš) Almasa (1936-1992)
Hodžić (Ahmo) Sadidin (1965-1992)
Jahić (Avdo) Almir (1975-1992)
Musić (Meho) Mehmed (1928-1993)
Pezić (Sulejman) Enis (1962-1992)
Salkić (Šaban) Nedžada (1974-1992)
Hajdarević (Emin) Suvada (1954-1992)
Heljo (Sejfo) Jasmin (1973-1992)
Salaharević (Muhamed) Edin (1973-1992)
Kičić (Munib) Galib (1974-1992)
Efendić (Ahmo) Mehmed (1973-1992)
Efendić (Ibro) Salko (1964-1992)
Arnaut (Ramo) Selim (1956-1992)
Hidić (Mehmedalija) Hakija (1952-1992)
Durić (Hamid) Osman (1956-1992)
Mekić (Haso) Melka (1912-1992)
Hurić (Himzo) Hajrudin (1965-1992)
Huremović (Mujo) Osman (1927-1992)
Mehmedović (Redžo) Nedžad (1966-1992)
Mehmedović (Redžo) Kemal (1964-1992)
Gagulić (Alija) Hajrudin (1963-1993)
Esmić (Muhamed) Mujo (1959-1993)
Heljo (Sejdo) Paša (1927-1992)
Jašarević (Sinan) Kadir (1959-1992)
Hadžić (Muradif) Enes (1961-1992)
Karač (Hamdija) Sead (1969-1992)
Patković (Huso) Hasib (1940-1992)
Ibralić (Šaban) Husein (1951-1992)
Begić (Hasan) Suljo (1928 -1995)
Ferhatović (Avdo) Advija (1974-1992)
Mušanović (Mustafa) Fahrudin (1961 – 1992)
Mušanović (Mustafa) Mevludin (1958 – 1992)
Kastrati (Ahmet) Rahman (1931 – 1992)
Hodžić (Juso) Rešid (1971-1993).

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, genocide, serb terror around srebrenica, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

ANNIVERSARY: MASSACRE OF CHILDREN IN SREBRENICA, CRIMES AGAINST BOSNIAKS BEFORE GENOCIDE

April 14, 2009 2 comments

On April 12th 1993, Serbs from heavily armed villages around Srebrenica massacred 74 Bosniak children and seriously injured more than 152 children in front of Srebrenica’s elementary school.

PHOTO: The blood-spattered Muslim survivor of the 1993 Srebrenica child massacre, identified as Sead Bekric, in hospital with his mom and brother. Click on a photo to view higher resolution.

On April 12th 1993, Serbs from militarized villages around Srebrenica attacked the town with heavy artillery hitting hospitals and schools. In this brutal attack, Serbs instantly killed 62 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) children, and injured more than 100 children in front of Srebrenica’s elementary school.

Another 12 children died in a hospital as a result of serious injuries sustained during the heavy artillery attack, bringing the total number od dead to 74.

Relatives of the victims visited this place again on Sunday to lay down flowers and pay respect to their loved ones, as well as to commemorate the 16th anniversary of this horrible crime against the children.

Bosnian Serb police was in charge of securing this peaceful commemoration and no incidents were reported.

Another event, titled Crimes Against Bosniaks Before July 1995 Genocide, was held in Srebrenica’s Cultural Center. The scheduled panel of speakers included Osman Suljić, mayor of Srebrenica municipality; Zulfo Salihović, vice president of Srebrenica municipality; Prof. Dr. Smail Čekić, Director of the Institute for Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law; and human rights activists Fadila Memišević i Hatidža Mehmedović.

Between 1991-1995 – not including the 1995 genocide – Serbs around Srebrenica torched approximately 95% of all Muslim villages in Podrinje region (where Srebrenica is located) and murdered more than 1,000 Bosniaks in brutal raids, ethnic cleansing, and horrific practices of torture. In 1992 alone, Serbs ethnically cleansed more than 90% of pre-dominanly Bosniak territory in Podrinje. To view photos of Serb terror around Srebrenica, click here.

DO NOT FORGET.

Note: You can view short video clip from Associated Press (for full-length video, you need to purchase a licence), at this link.

PHOTO: The blood-spattered Muslim survivor of the 1993 Srebrenica child massacre, identified as Sead Bekric, in hospital with his mom. Click on a photo to view higher resolution.

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, child massacre in srebrenica, genocide, massacre of children in srebrenica, srebrenica, srebrenica child massacre, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

3,000+ IMAGINARY “SERB VICTIMS” IN VILLAGES AROUND SREBRENICA

March 6, 2009 4 comments

SERBS FILE LAWSUIT AGAINST U.N. TO DIMINISH SIGNIFICANCE OF SREBRENICA GENOCIDE

Trying to gain wider media exposure and promote their already discredited version of the number of individual Serb casualties around Srebrenica, a group of Bosnian Serbs based in the Netherlands have filed a lawsuit at the Dutch District Court in The Hague claiming the United Nations and the Netherlands failed to protect them around Srebrenica during the 1992-1995 war.

As a result of military operations conducted against the Bosniak Muslim civilians in and around Srebrenica (1992-1995), Serbs suffered 151 civilian casualties. Now, in order to justify the genocide committed against the Bosniak Muslim population of Srebrenica, Serbian nationalists propagate grossly inflated claims that over 3,000 Serb civilians were murdered around Srebrenica. Milivoje Ivanisevic (background), who came up with this number, is a Srebrenica genocide denier himself. Ivanisevic’s claim that there are about “3,000+ Serb victims” have been discredited by the International Criminal Tribunal (source), Human Rights Watch (source), and Bosnia’s State-level Research and Documentation Center (source).

In 1993, the U.N. forces were sent to Srebrenica to protect Bosniaks (Muslims) from Serbs, not the other way around. During the Bosnian war, 1992-1995, Serbs kept Srebrenica under deadly siege and terrorized Bosniak civilians in the most horrible ways. In order to prolong the suffering of innocent Bosniak Muslim victims from 1992-1995, Serbs in villages around Srebrenica barricaded Muslim women, children, and elderly men in abandoned houses and then set them on fire alive (click here to see photos of Muslim victims around Srebrenica). Nonetheless to remind our readers that Serbs started killing Bosniak Muslim civilians around Srebrenica in 1992 and they never stopped until they committed genocide against the Bosniak Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995.

The latest lawsuit against the U.N. was filed by Stephen Karganovic (aka: Stefan Karganovic), who happens to be a founder of the Srebrenica genocide denial NGO known as “The Historical Project Srebrenica” (Historijski Projekat Srebrenica). He is also a close associate of Dr. Darko Trifunovic (background) and Milivoje Ivanisevic (background) – both of them discredited Srebrenica genocide deniers.

Karganovic uses careful words in the media and passes himself as a man who does not deny “Srebrenica massacre.” As many Srebrenica genocide deniers do, Karganovic accepts the term “massacre,” but refuses to acknowledge the proper term – Genocide. For him, there was no genocide against the Bosniak population of Srebrenica.

Recently, he stated: “Our parallel task is to investigate the allegations of genocide against Moslem prisoners and correct the record on that score.” Note that he used the term “allegations” in referring to the Srebrenica genocide.

“All we want to achieve is that the Serb victims from around Srebrenica get the same attention as the Muslim victims in Srebrenica,” he said. In other words, Karganovic’s purpose is to equate the genocide perpetrated against the Bosniak Muslim population of Srebrenica with individual war crimes against the Serbs.

Serb sources maintain that casualties and losses during the period prior to the creation of the safe area gave rise to Serb demands for revenge against the Bosniaks based in Srebrenica. The ARBiH raids are presented as a key motivating factor for the July 1995 genocide. This view is echoed by international sources including the 2002 report commissioned by the Dutch government on events leading to the fall of Srebrenica (the NIOD report [see Answer to Question #10]). However these sources also cite misleading figures for the number of Serb casualties in the region. The NIOD report, for instance, repeats the erroneous claim that the raid on Kravica resulted in the total annihilation of its population. Many consider these efforts to explain the motivation behind the Srebrenica massacre are merely revisionist attempts to justify the genocide. To quote the report to the UN Secretary-General on the Fall of Srebrenica:

“Even though this accusation is often repeated by international sources, there is no credible evidence to support it… The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the raids out of Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to create a geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the Drina, while freeing their troops to fight in other parts of the country. The extent to which this pretext was accepted at face value by international actors and observers reflected the prism of ‘moral equivalency’ through which the conflict in Bosnia was viewed by too many for too long.” – UN Report on Srebrenica

According to Human Rights Watch, the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party “launched an aggressive campaign to prove that Muslims had committed crimes against thousands of Serbs in the area” which “was intended to diminish the significance of the July 1995 crime.”

Serbian media is also circulating gruesome photo forgeries alleging they represent Serb ‘victims’ around Srebrenica. Take a look at a sample photo forgery of alleged “Serb victim” around Srebrenica at this link.

A press briefing by the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) dated 6 July 2005 noted that the number of Serb deaths in the region alleged by the Serbian authorities had increased from 1,400 to 3,500, a figure the OTP stated “[does] not reflect the reality.” The briefing cited previous accounts:

“The Republika Srpska’s Commission for War Crimes gave the number of Serb victims in the municipalities of Bratunac, Srebrenica and Skelani as 995; 520 in Bratunac and 475 in Srebrenica. The Chronicle of Our Graves by Milivoje Ivanisevic, president of the Belgrade Center for Investigating Crimes Committed against the Serbs, estimates the number of people killed at around 1,200. For the Honorable Cross and Golden Freedom, a book published by the RS Ministry of Interior, referred to 641 Serb victims in the Bratunac-Srebrenica-Skelani region.

The accuracy of these numbers is challenged: the OTP noted that although Ivanisevic’s book estimated that around 1200 Serbs were killed, personal details were only available for 624 victims. The validity of labeling some of the casualties as “victims” is also contested: studies have found a significant majority of military casualties compared to civilian casualties. This is in line with the nature of the conflict—Serb casualties died in raids by Bosniak forces on outlying villages used as military outposts for attacks on Srebrenica (many of which had been ethnically cleansed of their Bosniak majority population in 1992).

For example the village of Kravica was attacked by Bosniak forces on Orthodox Christmas Day, 7 January 1993. Some Serb sources such as Ivanisevic allege that the village’s 353 inhabitants were “virtually completely destroyed”. In fact, the VRS’ own internal records state that 46 Serbs died in the Kravica attack: 35 soldiers and 11 civilians, while the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office’s investigation of casualties on 7 and 8 January in Kravica and the surrounding villages found that 43 people were killed, of whom 13 were obviously civilians. Nevertheless the event continues to be cited by Serb sources as the key example of heinous crimes committed by Bosniak forces around Srebrenica.

As for the destruction and casualties in the villages of Kravica, Siljkovići, Bjelovac, Fakovići and Sikirić, the judgment states that the prosecution failed to present convincing evidence that the Bosnian forces were responsible for them, because the Serb forces used artillery in the fighting in those villages. In the case of the village of Bjelovac, Serbs even used the warplanes.” – Office of the United Nations Prosecutor

The most up-to-date analysis of Serb casualties in the region comes from the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center, a non-partisan institution with a multiethnic staff, whose data have been collected, processed, checked, compared and evaluated by international team of experts. The RDC’s extensive review of casualty data found that Serb casualties in the Bratunac municipality amounted to 119 civilians and 424 soldiers. It also established that although the 383 Serb victims buried in the Bratunac military cemetery are presented as casualties of ARBiH units from Srebrenica, 139 (more than one third of the total) had fought and died elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Book of the Dead, which was backed up by international experts (including Ewa Tabeau, head of the Demographic Unit research team of the U.N. war crimes tribunal in The Hague), lists 151 Serb civilian victims.

RECOMMENDED READING:
United Nations Srebrenica Report (1999) – Online PDF version available in 6 languages.
Srebrenica Numbers – Quick Facts

Editorial Reminder: All content on our blog is free to be republished unless otherwise noted. Please circulate and translate in other languages.

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, genocide, serb victims, serbian victims, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ADOPTS SREBRENICA GENOCIDE RESOLUTION

January 17, 2009 3 comments

July 11th as a Day of Commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide throughout the European Union (EU)

European Parliament adopts Srebrenica Genocide Resolution

The European Parliament has overwhelmingly adopted a resolution (by 556 to nine, with 22 abstentions) proclaiming the 11th of July a Day of Commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide throughout the European Union (EU).

After the fall of Srebrenica on July 11th 1995, Bosnian Serb forces, commanded by General Ratko Mladic, and paramilitary units rapidly executed more than 8000 Bosniak (Muslim) men, boys, and elderly, who had sought safety in the area. Moreover, approximately 25000 people were forcibly deported in a UN-assited ethnic cleansing.

The victims’ bodies were first buried in mass graves, then dug out with bulldozers and moved to smaller graves. Remains can be scattered in several locations, and are not released for burial until two-thirds of the body have been recovered.

The European Parliament resolution called the Srebrenica Genocide “the biggest war crime in Europe since the end of WWII.” The assembly called it “a symbol of the international community’s impotence to intervene and protect civilians.”

“Proclaiming July 11 as a day of remembrance for the Srebrenica genocide should be a step in the right direction for reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region,” European Commissioner for Foreign Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner said in support of the initiative.

“The EP stresses that reconciliation is an important part of the European integration process, a process in which the religious communities, the media and the education system play a significant role”, the Parliament added, noting that bringing to justice those responsible for the massacres is an important step towards peace and stability in the region.

“In view of the fact that General Ratko Mladic is still at large almost 14 years after the tragic events, Parliament also demands that further efforts be made to bring the remaining fugitives to justice, stressing that bringing to justice those responsible for the massacres in and around Srebrenica is an important step towards peace and stability in the region,” the European Parliament said.

Members of the European Parliament said additional measures must be taken to find and arrest those responsible, including the former Bosnian Serb leader General Ratko Mladic.

“What happened in Srebrenica in July 1995 is the worst single atrocity that Europe has experienced since World War II,” said Bosnia’s High Representative Miroslav Lajcak in his statement, welcoming the EU resolution. “By commemorating the victims of the genocide, we can help reduce the pain of those still waiting to hear what exactly happened to their relatives killed in Srebrenica and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

The resolution was drafted following a meeting between European Parliament President Diana Wallis, who is from the liberal and democratic grouping, and members of the Association of Mothers from Srebrenica and Zepa. Wallis and Jelko Kacin, a Slovenian delegate and the rapporteur on Serbia, attended the commemoration organized in Srebrenica last year.

Explaining the Resolution, Kacin said that “we must build Srebrenica in our common historical memory.” He said the resolution was not intended for the past, “although it speaks about the dead”, but is relevant to “the living and their better future.”

Editor’s Note: In 2007, Jelko Kacin issued the following statement, which we would like to share with you:

“Anybody who kills a single human being commits a crime, but those who commit genocide represent an international and political challenge.”

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, european parliament, genocide, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica genocide resolution, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

BOSNIAK WOMEN & CHILDREN BURNED ALIVE BY SERBS AROUND SREBRENICA

December 29, 2008 68 comments

VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED / Last updated: Dec 31, 2008.

The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) population of the Podrinje.

In order to prolong the suffering of innocent victims, Serbs around Srebrenica would barricade Bosniak women, children, and elderly men in abandoned houses and then set them on fire alive.

Those who tried to escape would be fired upon and killed. The youngest victim was 2 days old baby whose remains contained multiple bullet holes. Some babies died in their mothers’ wombs as you can see in forensic photos provided below. According to numerous testimonies presented at the ICTY, main organizers of these crimes were Mitar Vasiljevic, Milan Lukic, and Sredoje Lukic.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: All photos © Human Rights NGO Truth for Justice (www.ispa.ba); Photographer: Almir Arnaut; Used with Permission; Photos archived by www.Genocid.org project. Forensic evidence collected by the U.N. war crimes investigators. The remains of victims analyzed by the Department of Pathology at the University Clinical Center Tuzla. Click photos for higher resolution.

PHOTO: Remains of a pregnant Bosniak woman and her unborn baby excavated from a mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. Fetus body was preserved in mother’s womb with tiny legs and undeveloped brain clearly visible. The woman was barricaded in an abandoned house and then set on fire by Bosnian Serbs. When she tried to escape, she was shot with a single bullet to her stomach. In 1992, Serbs barricaded approximately 150 Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly men in two abandoned houses located in the Srebrenica region near Visegrad and then burned them alive. Zehra Turjacanin was the only survivor from the burning house in Bikavac and recently she testified ‘what it feels like to burn alive’ at the trial of Milan and Sredoje Lukic.

PHOTO: Pathologists at the University Clinical Center Tuzla examine remains of a pregnant Bosniak woman and her unborn baby found in mother’s womb. The woman was barricaded in an abandoned house and then set on fire by Bosnian Serbs. When she tried to escape, she was shot with a single bullet to her stomach. The victims were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of a pregnant Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) woman and her unborn baby excavated from the mass grave Suha in Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. Baby’s undeveloped head, fingers, and legs are clearly visible. The woman was barricaded in an abandoned house and then set on fire by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. When she tried to escape, she was shot with a single bullet to her stomach. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Pathologists at the University Clinical Center Tuzla show remains of a pregnant Bosniak woman and her unborn baby. She was barricaded in an abandoned house and then set on fire by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. When she tried to escape, she was shot with a single bullet to her stomach. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide, when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of a Bosniak woman and her unborn baby excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. Baby’s undeveloped body was preserved in mother’s womb. She was barricaded in an abandoned house and then set on fire by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. When she tried to escape, she was shot with a single bullet to her stomach. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Pathologist at the University Clinical Center Tuzla inspects remains of unborn Bosniak baby that was found in a womb of a murdered mother. The woman was barricaded in an abandoned house and then set on fire by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. When she tried to escape, she was shot with a single bullet to her stomach. The victims’ remains were excavated from the mass grave Suha in Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of a baby bottle and baby clothing containing multiple bullet holes were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The Bosniak victims were barricaded in an abandoned house, set on fire, and burned alive in 1992 by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide, when Serbs overtook Srebrenica summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of a baby bottle and baby clothing containing multiple bullet holes were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The Bosniak victims were barricaded in an abandoned house, set on fire, and burned alive in 1992 by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of a baby bottle and baby clothing with a bullet hole were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The Bosniak victims were barricaded in an abandoned house, set on fire, and burned alive in 1992 by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of Bosniak children killed by Serbs around Srebrenica. The victims were barricaded in an abandoned house, set on fire, and burned alive by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica in 1992. The victims’ remains were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide, when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of a Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) child and a baby killed by Serbs around Srebrenica. The victims were barricaded in an abandoned house, set on fire, and burned alive by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica in 1992. The victims’ remains were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Remains of Bosniak children killed by Serbs around Srebrenica. The victims were barricaded in an abandoned house, set on fire, and burned alive by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica in 1992. The victims’ remains were excavated from the mass grave Suha in the Srebrenica region, near Bratunac. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Dignitaries and forensic workers attend process of exhumation of victims from the mass grave Suha around Srebrenica, near Bratunac. Bosnian Muslim victims – women, children, and elderly men – were barricaded in abandoned houses and then set them on fire alive. Those who tried to escape were shot and killed. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosnian Muslim population of Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Dignitaries and forensic workers attend process of exhumation of victims from the mass grave Suha around Srebrenica, near Bratunac. Bosnian Muslim victims – women, children, and elderly men – were barricaded in abandoned houses and then set them on fire alive. Those who tried to escape were shot and killed. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

PHOTO: Dignitaries and forensic workers attend process of exhumation of victims from the mass grave Suha around Srebrenica, near Bratunac. Bosnian Muslim victims – women, children, and elderly men – were barricaded in abandoned houses and then set them on fire alive. Those who tried to escape were shot and killed. The events preceding and leading to the Srebrenica genocide included unprecedented levels of cruelty committed by Bosnian Serbs around Srebrenica against the civilian Bosniak population of the Podrinje. In July 1995, crimes against humanity had culminated in a crime of genocide when Serbs overtook Srebrenica, summarily executed between 8,372 and 10,000 Bosniaks (men, children, and elderly), and forcibly expelled more than 20,000 people in a U.N.-assisted case of ethnic cleansing.

According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, some of the victims that were burned alive included:

Kurspahic, Aisa – Approximately 49 years old.

Kurspahic, Aida – Approximately 12 years old.

Kurspahic, Ajka – Approximately 62 years old.

Kurspahic, Alija – Approximately 55 years old.

Kurspahic, Almir – Approximately 10 years old.

Kurspahic, Aner – Approximately 6 years old.

Kurspahic, Becar – Approximately 52 years old.

Kurspahic, Bisera – Approximately 50 years old.

Kurspahic, Bula – Approximately 58 years old.

Kurspahic, Dzheva – Approximately 22 years old.

Kurspahic, Enesa – Approximately 2 years old.

Kurspahic, first name unknown – Approximately 2 days old.

Kurspahic, Hasa – Approximately 18 years old

Kurspahic, Hajrija – Approximately 60 years old.

Kurspahic, Halida – Approximately 10 years old.

Kurspahic, Hana – Approximately 30 years old.

Kurspahic, Hasan – Approximately 50 years old.

Kurspahic, Hasiba – Age unknown

Kurspahic, Hasnija – Approximately 62 years old

Kurspahic, Hata – Approximately 68 years old.

Kurspahic, Ifeta – Approximately 17 years old.

Kurspahic, Igabala – Approximately 58 years old.

Kurspahic, Ismet – Approximately 3 years old.

Kurspahic, Ismeta – Approximately 26 years old.

Kurspahic, Izeta – Approximately 24 years old

Kurspahic, Kada – Approximately 40 years old

Kurspahic, Latifa – Approximately 23 years old.

Kurspahic, Lejla – Approximately 4 years old.

Kurspahic, Maida – Age is unknown, she was a little girl.

Kurspahic, Medina – Approximately 28 years old.

Kurspahic, Medo – Approximately 50 years old.

Kurspahic, Mejra – Approximately 47 years old.

Kurspahic, Meva – Approximately 45 years old.

Kurspahic, Mina – Approximately 20 years old.

Kurspahic, Mirela – Approximately 3 years old.

Kurspahic, Mujesira – Approximately 35 years old.

Kurspahic, Munevera – Approximately 20 years old.

Kurspahic, Munira – Approximately 12 years old.

Kurspahic, Munira – Approximately 55 years old

Kurspahic, Osman – Approximately 67 years old

Kurspahic, Pasana or Pasija – Approximately 56 years old

Kurspahic, Ramiza – Approximately 57 years old

Kurspahic, Sabiha – Approximately 14 years old

Kurspahic, Sadeta – Approximately 18 years old

Kurspahic, Safa – Approximately 50 years old

Kurspahic, Saha – Approximately 70 years old

Kurspahic, Sajma – Approximately 20 years old

Kurspahic, Seila – Approximately 2 years old

Kurspahic, Seniha – Approximately 9 years old

Kurspahic, Sumbula – Approximately 62 years old

Kurspahic, Vahid – Approximately 8 years old

A boy whose name is unknown – Approximately 11 years old

Aljic, first name unknown, father of Suhra Aljic – Approximately 65 years old

Alijic, first name unknown, mother of Suhra Aljic – Aproximately 65 years old

Aljic, first name unknown, son of Suhra Aljic – Approximately 1 year old

Aljic, Suhra – Approximately 25 years old

Jelacic, first name unknown – Age unknown

Tufekcic, Dehva – Approximately 28 years old

Tufekcic, Elma – Approximately 5 years old

Tufekcic, Ensar – Approximately 1.5 years old

Turjacanin, Dulka – Approximately 51 years old

Turjacanin, Sada – Approximately 29 years old

Turjacanin, Selmir – Approximately 9 years old

Vilic, first name unknown, daughter of Mina Vilic – Age unknown

Vilic, first name unknown, son of Mina Vilic – Age unknown

Vilic, Mina – Approximately 32 years old

Vilic, Mirzeta – Approximately 8 years old

Ajanovic, Mula – Approximately 75 years old.

Delija, Adis – Approximately 2 years old

Delija, Ajnija – Approximately 50 years old

Delija, Jasmina – Approximately 24 years old

Family name unknown – Hasena Age unknown

Jasarevic, Tima – Age unknown

Jasarevic, Hajra – Approximately 35 years old.

Jasarevic, Meho – Approximately 42 years old.

Jasarevic, Mujo – Approximately 47 years old.

Memisevic, Fazila – Approximately 54 years old

Memisevic, Redzo – Approximately 57 years old

Sadikovic, Rabija – Approximately 52 years old

Sehic, Enver – Approximately 13 years old

Sehic, Faruk – Approximately 12 years old

Sehic, Haraga – Age unknown

Sehic, Kada – Approximately 39 years old

Velic, Nurka – Approximately 70 years old

Velic, Tima – Approximately 35 years old

Vila, Jasmina – Approximately 20 years old

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, burned alive, children, elderly, genocide, milan lukic, milan susnjar, mitar vasiljevic, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre, sredoje lukic, victims, visegrad, visegrad massacre, women

IN MEMORIAM: DR NEDRET MUJKANOVIC, SREBRENICA’S WAR SURGEON AND A TRUE HERO

December 28, 2008 7 comments

Last updated: January 7, 2009.

Risked his life to reach Srebrenica on foot through hostile Serb-held territory in 1992.
Worked as Srebrenica’s war-Surgeon and saved many lives in the Enclave under the siege.
Recipient of the Golden Lily medal – the Bosnian Army’s (ARBiH) most prestigious award.
Recipient of the Saint Peter dabrobosanski medal – the biggest award of Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see here).
His team of pathologists worked on identifying Srebrenica victims, including pregnant women and children that Serbs around Srebrenica burned alive (see photos).
Served as a a key Prosecution witness at Naser Oric’s trial. [Note: His testimony actually helped the Defence]
His life in Srebrenica was documented in a book titled “War Hospital: A True Story Of Surgery And Survival” by Sheri Lee Fink (limited preview here)

Dr. Nedret Mujkanovic’s (48) lifeless body was found by his wife Jasminka in their Tuzla home around 4:00 am on December 25th 2008. Local Bosnian media widely reported the cause of his death as “suicide by hanging.” According to a local web portal, Tuzlarije, his colleague Dr. Lejla Muminhodzic said that Dr Mujkanovic’s neighbours heard him begging and screaming for help for about 10 minutes. Apparently, neighbours reported a loud noise, as if somebody was slamming objects. However, his wife Jasminka told police that her husband attempted to commit suicide just a night before. His funeral was held on Saturday, December 27th. The case is under police investigation.

In 1992, Dr Nedret Mujkanovic was asked to risk his life and trudge for seven nights through miles of hostile territory from Tuzla to Srebrenica. According to War Hospital: A True Story of Surgery and Survival by Sheri Lee Fink,

“When the ham radio operators in Srebrenica started calling for a surgeon, the responsibility for finding one fell to Tuzla’s surgery department chairman, an Orthodox Christian in a still-mixed but increasingly Muslim city being attacked by separatist Orthodox Christian Serbs… he knew he had little chance of convincing any surgeons to go to Srebrenica against their will, and, with 40 percent of the surgical faculty in Tuzla having fled at the start of the war, he didn’t have much of a selection. After an unsuccessful search for volunteers among the better-trained surgeons, he landed on Nedret, one of his last hopes. The chairman summoned Nedret from his field station to the hospital and made his request. Would Nedret go to Srebrenica? Nedret was flattered to be asked, but how could he get there given the intervening sixty miles of territory controlled by the nationalist Serb military?”

According to Chuck Sudetic (The New York Times, April 24, 1993), Dr Mujkanovic accepted the risky mission and managed to reach Srebrenica by August 5th 1992. “The medicines, bandages and other medical supplies, carried into Srebrenica by 50 men who accompanied him on his trek through Serbian lines, started to run out in mid-September… Dr. Mujkanovic estimated that during his nine months in Srebrenica about 10 to 15 percent of the 4,000 patients brought to the town’s hospital died… Between December and early March, about 20 to 30 people were dying daily from pneumonia and other diseases worsened by long-term hunger,” reported Sudetic.

As the only surgeon in the besieged town, Dr. Mujkanovic performed 1,390 operations, 100 amputations and four Cesarean sections – many times without anesthetics. According to war correspondent, Peter Maass, (The New Republic, October 12 1998) “…in addition to Muslims, he operated on captured Serb soldiers and protected them from the retribution that many people in Srebrenica desired.”

In The New York Times article, Dr Mujkanovic recalled some of the horrors he experienced during his stay in Srebrenica. “The Serbs knew there was a camp of refugees from Cerska and Konjevic Polje in the school,” he said. “They directed their fire at that location. It came completely by surprise. There were pieces of women scattered about, and you could not see how to fit them together. I saw one dead mother lying on the ground and holding the hands of her two dead children. They all had no heads.”

After the war, Dr. Mujkanovic received the Golden Lily medal (“Zlatni Ljiljan”), the highest level of recognition awarded by the Army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The medal was awarded in recognition of Dr. Mujkanovic’s service, bravery, and commitment to save lives in the besieged enclave of Srebrenica.

On November 1st 2004, Christian Orthodox Mitropolit Dabrobosanski Nikolaj awarded Dr. Nedret Mujkanovic a medal of Saint Petar Dabrobosanski – the biggest award of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This prestigious recognition was awarded to Dr. Mujkanovic as a sign of appreciation for taking care of Bosnian Serb Orthodox church priests Jeremia and Aleksandar Starovlah who were injured during SFOR action at Pale. At that time, Dr Mujkanovic worked as the director of the University of Clinical Center (UCC) Tuzla (see “Acknowledgments” section of the UCC Tuzla web site).

In 2005, Dr Mujkanovic served as one of key Prosecution witnesses in Naser Oric case. However, his testimony helped the Defence. He testified that Naser Oric’s forces had to attack militarized Serb-villages around Srebrenica in desperate attempts of starving Bosniak civilians to find food. For example, Serbs used the village of Fakovici as a military outpost for massive attacks on Srebrenica. “No one, including Oric, could have [had] effective control over civilians and the armed forces,” he testified. Oric was “fiercely opposed to those acts of burning and looting” he insisted. Dr. Mujkanovic testified that Oric often visited patients in his hospital. Prosecutors wanted to know whether he was interested in well-being of Serb patients. Dr. Mujkanovic confirmed that Oric “paid the same sort of attention to everyone, [Bosniaks] and Serbs alike.”

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, dr. nedret mujkanovic, genocide, nedret mujkanovic, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica hero, srebrenica massacre

FORESEEABLE GENOCIDE: TESTIMONY BY PIERRE SALIGNON (MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES)

December 17, 2008 8 comments

PHOTO (click here for higher resolution): Sevket Civic prays at the grave of his son buried among thousands of killed Bosnian Muslims at a cemetery in Potocari near Srebrenica on the first day of Eid al-Adha December 8, 2008.

“According to a DutchBat witness, several women who entered the compound handed their malnourished babies to DutchBat members ‘because they just didn’t know anymore what to do and what their future would bring.’ This witness also testified that several times babies were thrust into his arms ‘which were so swollen that they finally died.’ Another DutchBat witness testified that a total of 11 people died in the DutchBat compound, among whom were children who died of dehydration. It was estimated that the refugees would survive only three or four days under the prevailing conditions.” [Trial Judgment: Blagojević & Jokić (IT-02-60)]

PHOTO (click here for higher resolution): A young Bosnian who lost relatives in the 1995 Srebrenica genocide walks inside the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial cemetery in Potocari July 22, 2008.

“Dutchbat soldiers told the MSF team about corpses lying near their compound. In the Ministry of Defence debriefing report, various Dutch soldiers say that bodies had been seen or that they had witnessed events that made them fear the worst. Some Dutchbat soldiers also provided horrifying eyewitness accounts when they arrived in Zagreb at the end of July… With so much intelligence pointing to an orchestrated deportation and massacre, it is incomprehensible that Dutchbat had no knowledge of the events unfolding around them. Since they did know about it, which was made clear from later testimonies, why was there silence and inaction?” [Srebrenica: Questions or the Future, Médecins Sans Frontières Holland, 4 April 2002].

PHOTO (click here for higher resolution): A Bosnian Muslim woman, survivor of genocide operations in Srebrenica 1995, looks away in disappointment, as she watches live broadcast of Hague Tribunal’s trial for Radovan Karadzic, in Sarajevo, on 29 August, 2008.

Here are excerpts from a testimony presented by Pierre Salignon, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) Program Coordinator in 1995 for the former Yugoslavia. (During the French Parliamentary Hearing into the Srebrenica Tragedy, 2001)

THE PREDICTABILITY OF THE MASSACRES

In July 1995, when the Serbian forces in Bosnia launched their offensive against Srebrenica, the massacre of the local inhabitants was foreseeable, no matter what is said by certain French leaders who have appeared before you.

Since the beginning of hostilities in 1991, the war of “ethnic cleansing” which was ravaging the former Yugoslav federation had already triggered the greatest wave of refugees seen in Europe since the end of the Second World War. In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, nearly 2.7 million of the 5 million inhabitants had to flee their homes, while hundreds of thousands of others sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Several tens of thousands of civilians were killed by shelling or murdered by snipers.

PHOTO (click here for higher resolution): Forensic anthropologists Ewa Klonowski (right) and Piotr Drukier examine the partially preserved hands of a teenage boy, found in a mass grave of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide. Photo by Sara Terry – a former staff correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor.

Four years before the Srebrenica massacre, the circumstances of the fall of Vukovar in 1991 had already shown that civilian massacres were an integral part of the war of ethnic cleansing. Before the town of Vukovar fell to Slobodan Milosevic’s men on 18 November 1991 after an atrocious siege lasting 86 days, an MSF convoy had managed to evacuate 100 seriously wounded. They were not allowed to go back for the remaining patients (more than 200). It was a terrible shock to learn a few weeks later that they had all been executed and thrown into mass graves.

The April 6, 1992 assault launched by the Serbian nationalists against the new state of Bosnia then led to the spread of ethnic cleansing to Bosnia. Hundreds of towns and villages were systematically destroyed and burned by the militias of the Serbian leader in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic. Tens of thousands of civilians were imprisoned and tortured, while the “elite” were massacred in unforgettably sinister concentration camps: Omarska, Manjaca, Trnopolje, Keraterm…. the whole operation running smoothly according to a carefully laid out plan.

Under pressure from international public opinion, shocked by the pictures of emaciated prisoners, the Western states protested and the camps were closed; but the process of ethnic cleansing continued… Who can forget the massacres committed in 1992 and 1993 in eastern Bosnia in Zvornik, Cerska, Bratunac, Foca. Each one was methodically organised; the men and adolescents of fighting age were imprisoned and executed, while the women were raped, tortured or deported.

Everyone, not just the French authorities, was well aware of the methods being used by General Mladic and his troops launched their attack on Srebrenica in July 1995.

France’s ambassador to Bosnia, Henri Jacolin, has told you how he sent a telegram, aptly titled Chronicle of an Ethnic Cleansing Foretold, to Paris in 1993, informing the government of the clearly stated political and military objectives of the Serbian nationalists.

Jean-René Ruez, the chief investigator for the Srebrenica tragedy for the International Criminal Tribunal, said in his testimony that as early as 1994 General Mladic had publicly announced his intention to exterminate the Muslim population of Eastern Bosnia.

Finally, at the initiative of France, UN Security Council Resolution 819 established Srebrenica as a “safe area”. The preamble of the resolution referred to the risk of genocide that threatened the population to be protected.

I first went to Srebrenica in March 1994. What I saw was literally a ghetto, an open-air prison. The United Nations had established the Muslim enclave in Srebrenica as a “protected zone” in April 1993. It had been put under the protection of an UNPROFOR contingent after the Bosnian soldiers had been disarmed.

More than 40,000 civilians, mostly women, children and elderly, were living in terrible conditions. They were subject to both the Bosnian-Serb militia’s blockade and the controls of the UN soldiers. At the time, my impression when I entered Srebrenica was that the law of the aggressors prevailed, and the UN forces simply complied. Although the UNPROFOR presence initially curbed cease-fire violations, what it was mainly doing was playing into the hands of General Mladic’s forces by prohibiting the Bosnians from entering or leaving Srebrenica. The inhabitants were caught in a trap. Access to Srebrenica was controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities, who at whim refused entry or exit to aid organisations and confiscated the contents of convoys. UNPROFOR was unable to intervene.

The civilian population received the bare minimum to survive. The situation was particularly difficult in the city, where more than 20,000 people were concentrated into an area where only 5,000 inhabitants had lived before the war.

In 1994, action by the UN peacekeepers consisted solely of maintaining the military status quo. No consideration was ever given to using force to end the siege. UNPROFOR’s Canadian battalion was trapped for several months before being relieved. I remember talking with the Canadian forces, who were subjected to daily ridicule and who were disgusted by their mission. I also remember the emaciated refugees, their fear that Srebrenica would be attacked, that they would be slaughtered and their memories of the ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia in 1992 and 1993.

The situation continued to deteriorate in the months that followed, which led MSF to question the usefulness of its operations in the eastern Bosnian enclaves. Despite ourselves, we had become “prison doctors”. I remember writing in the MSF newsletter in June 1994 that “the lack of international political will means that we are now providing social services for the occupying forces while waiting for the civilian population to be displaced and the ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia to be completed.” The UN forces were not given adequate resources for their mission. There were too few of them, they were poorly equipped, they were trapped and had become hostages.

On October 20, 1994, in an opinion column published in the French daily Libération, I also wrote about the future of the inhabitants of Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa. I said that their future “was dependent on the will of the international community to see them survive.” Without support from the international community, I was convinced that Srebrenica and Zepa would soon fall and that the worst would then happen. That is why MSF worked so hard to keep its medical teams in Srebrenica. We hoped that the presence of foreign witnesses would make the murderers hesitate.

The pace accelerated in early 1995, when wide-scale fighting resumed in Bosnia. It was impossible to get supplies to the Bosnian capital. Srebrenica and the other enclaves in eastern Bosnia were effectively strangled. Humanitarian convoys were allowed in only occasionally, with minimum supplies. Several times, teams from MSF, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees came under direct attack from snipers around Sarajevo, Gorazde and Srebrenica.

During another visit to Srebrenica in March 1995, I had to negotiate for several hours with the local authorities in Bratunac before being able to enter the enclave. The militia were arrogant and mocked us. They made no secret of the fact that—I quote—”When the time comes, they would kill all the Muslims.”

The population of Srebrenica was about to experience its third winter under siege, and it had become virtually impossible to get humanitarian supplies into the city. The cease-fire was being violated more and more frequently. The refugees wanted “to leave this living hell, no matter what the cost.”

Beginning on April 15, 1995, the authorities in Pale opposed the rotation of MSF volunteers working in Srebrenica and Gorazde. They blew hot and cold and tried to break the diplomatic isolation to which they had been subject for several months. They were using access to the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia by aid organizations to apply pressure during negotiations with the United Nations.

On the 14 June 1995, right in the middle of the hostage crisis, our representative in Pale, Stéphan Oberreit, still confronted with the authorities’ refusal to let us into Srebrenica and Gorazde, sent us a message. He stressed although the Bosnian Serb military may have given way on the UNPROFOR hostages, they were in fact toughing their stand. Military preparations against the enclaves were taking shape and it was becoming increasingly clear that the military did not want to see us there if there was to be an offensive and slaughter, which he felt to be relatively certain. He also asked us some questions: “What should we do? Should we leave Srebrenica and Gorazde for safety reasons and as it is impossible for us to bring in new teams? Should we stay there despite the risks?”

I am mentioning this message sent in June to demonstrate the fact that at that time our volunteers in the field had no doubts about the attack on the enclave. There was therefore all the more reason that the western military observers should have known this too.

This was the background to my visit to Pale from the 17 to the 26 June 1995. Our teams in the enclaves were exhausted and worried, but they were refusing to leave until they were sure that they would be replaced. In actual fact Professor Nicola Koljevic, the Vice President of the Bosnian Serbs, made no opposition to our staff leaving Bosnia, but put up obstacles preventing us from bringing in new teams. According to him the military opposed this. During my stay I met Professor Koljevic and his Health Minister, Monsieur Dragan Kalinic, many times. During these meetings they put forward their concerns about the fighting, which was intensifying throughout Bosnia. We were accused of being spies, of helping their “enemies” whereas, according to them, the Bosnians were using the enclaves in eastern Bosnia to carry out military actions against the Serbs. They talked about villages being burned down and civilians executed near Srebrenica. At the time Professor Koljevic used this as an excuse to tell us about future reprisals against United Nations safe areas in the eastern Bosnia and made no secret of the military’s wish to seek revenge.

During these meetings we also heard about contact in June 1995 between French officers, General Janvier, Head of the Peacekeeping force in Bosnia, General de Lapresle, and General Mladic. Professor Koljevic talked freely about this, without going into detail, but did not hide the fact that (and I quote) “the hostage business was settled”.

After waiting several days we received permission to enter Srebrenica and then Gorazde with no further explanations given. We just learned that some senior people from the United Nations were expected to visit, in particular Monsieur Bijeveld, the Special Envoy of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in ex-Yugoslavia. Professor Koljevic made no secret of the fact that the entry permits given to MSF were useful to him, as they let him show the West the Pale authorities’ willingness to cooperate, despite the fact that the UNPROFOR was being blocked at the same time. He was convinced that the war was coming to an end, that the enclaves’ fate would soon be sealed and that peace was just around the corner.

A small medical team—a nurse and a doctor—were allowed to go to Srebrenica on the 24 June 1995. The Pale authorities however refused to allow an expatriate surgeon to join them. The ICRC and UNPROFOR were also negotiating permission to enter the enclaves, but were still being refused.

Before this stay in Pale I feared that Srebrenica would be attacked, however when I returned to Paris in early July of 1995 I was convinced it would happen. I knew that it was now just a matter of time.

UNPROFOR’s ABANDONMENT OF THE POPULATION OF SREBRENICA

For the first few days after the Bosnian Serb forces launched their attack on Srebrenica, we thought that NATO and UNPROFOR would react. When I say “we” I am referring to the MSF volunteers in Srebrenica, Belgrade, Sarajevo, and also to MSF management in Paris. Everyone expected NATO air strikes. On the evening of the 10 July, Commander Karremans was still promising air strikes to the Srebrenican authorities. Our team in the field told you about this during their hearing.

We knew that the United Nations troops were limited in number, and lacked equipment, we knew that the few Bosnian soldiers still present in the enclaves were not heavily armed, and yet we still held onto the idea that, just like in Gorazde in April 1994, something would happen, that the presence of forward air controllers in the enclave up to the last day of the offensive was a sign of future NATO actions.

But we were wrong.

As you now know, the many requests for air strikes, which were, according to the UN report, repeatedly put forward by the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica, were all refused. As commander of the United Nations military presence in Bosnia, General Janvier had the power to authorise them. When he finally gave his permission on 11 July it was too late. NATO’s two air strikes became a symbol of the Western states’ lack of courage and abdication of responsibility. The enclave had already fallen and acts of violence against the population were beginning.

I do not have the expertise to judge whether it was possible for NATO to carry out strikes to defend Srebrenica, but what is immediately obvious is that the arguments put forward to justify the absence of strikes are in contradiction to the facts. As in Bosnia, when we wanted to strike, we acted.

General de Lapresle confirmed in his hearing that he never had any technical problems with the much disparaged “double key” system which was said to be responsible for the lateness of NATO air strikes on Srebrenica.

The lack of NATO air strikes was also for a while explained by the refusal by the Dutch authorities to endanger the lives of their soldiers in Srebrenica. We now know that Dutch request for the cessation of NATO air strikes came after the fall of Srebrenica and was even anticipated by the decision of French General Gobillard, who felt that they were no longer of any use as the Srebrenica “safe zone” had already fallen. There was thus no veto by the Dutch government to prevent the NATO aircraft from striking before 11 July 1995.

Finally, another technical argument was put forward to explain the inaction of UNPROFOR and NATO in Srebrenica and that was the lack of forward air controllers to direct the air strikes by the NATO planes. This argument has also been disproved and we now know that there was not one but two teams of controllers on the ground, who were operational up until the fall of the enclave: a Dutch team and a British team. Strangely, the existence of this team has never been officially recognised by the British government, although confirmed by the MSF team present in Srebrenica at the time.

This is why the lack of credible official explanations continues to feed the rumour mill concerning the reasons for the lack of NATO air support when the Bosnian-Serb troops attacked Srebrenica.

Was an agreement concluded outside the UN between the French authorities and General Mladic to free the hostages against a promise to halt the use of NATO aircraft against the positions of the Bosnian-Serb army? Personally, I cannot say. I do however hope that your work will shed light on what really happened.

With the Bosnian Serb forces entering the Srebrenica safe area on July 6, 1995, the question of protection became essential. The massacres were predictable and all men of fighting age were in danger of being killed.

Despite the cynicism shown by most Western states since the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, we nonetheless expected the United Nations force to offer protection to those refugees who sought it. We felt that even if the fall of Srebrenica were foreseeable, the peacekeepers would stand up against violence against the civilian population, which had collected inside and in front of the United Nations base in Potocari. We felt that they would at least attempt to facilitate their evacuation in humane conditions.

We could not imagine that the UN troops would hand the population over to the Serb militias. Right up to the end, the MSF team in Srebrenica refused to believe that the UN would fail to react. We were wrong.

On the morning of 11 July, while we still believed that extensive NATO air strikes would take place, and that the promise made to the Srebrenica authorities by Commander Karremans on the evening of the 10th would be met, nothing of any significance happened. The NATO aircraft attacked, but it was too late, as General Mladic’s men were already in the town.

While part of the terrified population of Srebrenica fled to the UNPROFOR base in Potocari to seek the protection of the United Nations, the Peackeepers barred base access to trucks loaded with wounded and Bosnian medical personnel who had just evacuated Srebrenica hospital. Only the determination of the Bosnian doctors and refugees who mobbed the gates of the United Nations base, forced them to let them in.

On 12 July, the Peacekeeping troops found themselves isolated and were forced to negotiate their surrender with General Mladic. Nothing specific seems to have been envisaged to protect the civilian population on the part of the UNPROFOR hierarchy, at the time in the hands of two French generals, General Janvier in Zagreb, and General Gobilliard in Sarajevo.

Without more material and diplomatic support, the Blue Helmets had no other choice than to “cooperate” with the Bosnian Serb soldiers, who controlled the situation. The peacekeepers found themselves playing an active role in deporting refugees who had sought their protection in Potocari. In practice, they took part in sorting out the refugees and helped the Serbian militias control the crowd before the refugees were forced to board the buses that General Mladic had requisitioned to deport them. Certain peacekeepers were even forced to hand over their uniforms, weapons and vehicles to the Serbian militias, who then used them for their criminal activities, to separate the men from the women and hunt down those who had fled into the forest.

The men who took refuge in Potocari believing that they enjoyed the protection of the United Nations were handed over to the Bosnian Serb forces, some of them having been disarmed by the UN troops themselves. About 700 men had found refuge in the UNPROFOR base in Potocari while nearly 2000 others were in the fields and hangars outside the UN base.

Under the pretext of protecting the women and children, all the men of Srebrenica were considered by the peacekeepers to be “potential combatants” and were handed over to the Bosnian Serb forces. It mattered little that they were unarmed. It mattered little that the shots heard in the hangars near the UNPROFOR base in Potocari, were clear signs that the executions had already started.

The wounded were not spared and on 14 July 1995, when the list of wounded received in the UNPROFOR base in Potocari was drawn up by the MSF team and Bosnian staff, it was above all to protect them and prevent them simply disappearing during the evacuation. To our horror and stupefaction this list, which was then handed over to UNPROFOR, was to enable General Mladic’s men to select their victims more easily, without those in charge of the UNPROFOR force in Potocari being able to do anything about it.

By July 13, 1995, in Tuzla, under the control of the Sarajevo authorities, news was beginning to circulate about a column of refugees who were attempting to flee the enclave through the forest. Nothing however was planned to help them. While the escaped women spoke of the columns of prisoners they had seen leaving the forests near Bratunac and Koljevic Polje, the United Nations and the Western governments did and said nothing. The massacres continued for several days in complete impunity. More than 7000 victims, mostly men, were then executed and thrown into mass graves. More than 2000 were taken prisoner in Potocari, with the others captured as they attempted to escape through the forest.

I find it hard to believe that it was not possible to help them.

If we just stop for a moment and look at the figures, there is no escaping the fact that 100% of the men who trusted the UN and sought refuge and protection from the Blue Helmets on the Potocari base were handed over by the UN and were murdered, whereas a good number of those who tried to escape under the protection of the Bosnian army, taking the risk of crossing Serb military lines and minefields, survived. There were 4000 survivors from a column of about 10,000 people.

On 24 June 1995, with the first Serb incursion into Srebrenica, we in Paris were sure that a large-scale Serb attack had been launched. We were then in contact with the field and with many journalists in Europe, with representatives of the United Nations and the UNPROFOR, to warn them of what was about to happen.

We were constantly on the phone to MSF volunteers in the field, in Belgrade, Zagreb, Pale and Srebrenica, but also with the HCR and the ICRC in Geneva, Mr. Kofi Annan in New York, and many others.

As the news from Srebrenica reached us, we made it public. Starting on 6 July 1995, MSF issued almost daily press releases describing the tragedy and expressed its greatest concern as to the fate of the civilian population. On 12 July, MSF denounced the separation of the men and women, in plain view of the UN peacekeepers, and the transfer of the prisoners to the Bratunac stadium. Several calls for protection of the population were issued. With the arrival of the first escapees in the Tuzla region, our personnel in the field bore witness to the clear signs of ill treatment shown by many women and girls. The escapees also spoke of the massacres in progress. On the evening of 13 July, the Serbian forces had finished deporting most of the population, which had sought refuge with the UNPROFOR in Potocari, some 30,000 people, two thirds of whom were inhabitants of the enclave. However, in a release published on 14 July, MSF already stressed the fact that if the majority of the refugees in Potocari came from the south of the Srebrenica enclave, there was still no news of the several thousand civilians from the villages further to the north. In Tuzla, in Bosnian territory, there were already rumours of a column of more than 10,000 people trying to break through the Bosnian Serb army’s defensive lines. The escaped women explained that most of the men had preferred not to go to Potocari, as they were convinced that they would not be protected by the peacekeepers. They were mostly, although not exclusively, men, refugees, unarmed adolescents, protected by a few Bosnian soldiers.

Despite this information, UNPROFOR stood passively by. The European states, including France, simply protested without doing anything. The French President, Jacques Chirac, issued public declarations to explain that France was ready to retake Srebrenica. But there was no retaking of the town and in fact nothing at all to even try to prevent the massacres in the enclave or help the people fleeing through the forest.

Yet even if the Srebrenica enclave was not defendable, the international community, in this case France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, could at least have organised the safe evacuation of the inhabitants of the enclave as soon as the Bosnian Serb offensive began and in the following days. Several days elapsed between the beginning of the offensive against Srebrenica, on 6 July 1995, and the presumed end of the massacres which lasted at least until 16 July according to the investigations of the International Criminal Tribunal and the United Nations report.

This is why the responsibility of those who were supposed to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica must be established.

THE MANIPULATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION BY FRENCH DIPLOMACY

The French political and military leaders who have passed before you all stressed the key role played by France in Bosnia, within the United Nations. They are all legitimately proud as France was the first country to contribute troops to the former Yugoslavia. Many French soldiers lost their lives there. France was also the instigator behind the adoption of many UN Security Council resolutions, including those setting up the “safe area” and establishing the right to use force to protect them.

I would just like to recall that throughout the war in the former Yugoslavia, humanitarian organisations such as MSF criticised the UN’s militaro-humanitarian operation in Bosnia.

The participation of more than 7000 French soldiers with a humanitarian mandate in the UN peacekeeping force maintained an illusion of French political determination to put an end to the violence perpetrated against the civilian population.

Humanitarian aid was the only response to the ethnic cleansing and shelling of civilians. In other words, faced with war crimes and crimes against humanity, soldiers were sent to hand out medication, blankets and flour.

I feel that this “militaro-humanitarian observation” of ethnic cleansing helped to create the conditions for the massacre of the inhabitants of Srebrenica. Why? Because to give a humanitarian mandate to military forces in an open conflict situation in which mass crimes are being committed is tantamount to disarming them. In other words, this pseudo-humanitarian policy followed by France in Bosnia was in the end conducted to the detriment of real protection of the civilian population.

It is worrying to see that your investigations into the tragedy of Srebrenica have for the time being involved no criticism of this type of operation by the French army abroad. The humanitarian or civilian protection goal continues to be one of the avowed aims in order to legitimise the deployment of French troops abroad, without this aim being in fact borne out in reality.

In the case of Srebrenica, it is of great concern, as mentioned by Mr. Levitte in his hearing, that the reason the French leaders hardened their position with regard to General Mladic and his men was the shock felt by the highest echelons of the government at the images of the UN peacekeepers chained up as a human shield by the Bosnian-Serb forces. It is because the French political leaders felt themselves to be humiliated that they decided on real military action against the gunnery positions shelling Sarajevo in particular. The massacres perpetrated throughout the war in Bosnia by General Mladic’s forces against the local people—ostensibly under the protection of the UNPROFOR—was never really a political preoccupation. This is the substance of what is claimed by Mr. Lévitte who states that the French leaders perceived Srebrenica (and I quote) “as background noise”.

At each attack against the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, against Gorazde in April 1994, then against Bihac in the following November, and finally against Srebrenica in July 1995, humanitarian aid was presented as the only possible answer to the crisis, while the presence of 40,000 peacekeeping troops in the field became an alibi for holding back from any military action which would endanger them, thereby offering the Bosnian-Serb forces a green light to kill at will.

After a further massacre in Tuzla in May 1995, the NATO air strikes finally showed the absurdity and fragility of the UNPROFOR organisation in the field. In the Spring of 95, at a crucial moment in the war and the peace negotiations in Bosnia, the UN found itself even further weakened and obliged to negotiate the release of more than 400 peacekeepers held hostage by the Serbian forces in Bosnia. The United Nations decided to concentrate the UNPROFOR troops scattered throughout Bosnia to prevent such a scenario happening again. This reorganisation of the United Nations’ military forces, promoted by France at the Security Council at the end of May 95 and then validated by the Contact Group, was an early warning sign of military abandonment of the east Bosnian enclaves, in particular Srebrenica.

This reorganisation was closely linked, amongst other things, to the progress of the peace process. Mr. Akashi stated in his hearing that the use of military force did not depend on the imperative of protecting the population, but that it was strictly determined by the progress of the peace process in Bosnia.

It is therefore all the more serious that certain French officials continue to insist, although implausible, that the fall of Srebrenica was unpredictable. Pseudo technical questions are raised that cloud the evident fact: the fall of Srebrenica, as well as the massacres that followed, were clearly predictable.

It is still not clear what role the Peacekeeper’s concern for protection had to play in the decision not to use NATO air strikes during the Bosnian Serb attack. It is also not clear if the concern to facilitate peace negotiations between Serbs, Muslims and Croates did not contribute to the Contact Group’s decision to abandon the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, along with the population in them. However, the facts are there to show that the disappearance of these two enclaves in eastern Bosnia did indeed facilitate the signing of the Dayton peace agreement only two months after these tragic events.

CONCLUSION

…Finally, I regret that no survivor of the Srebrenica massacres has yet been invited before the French parliament during these hearings. It would have been an important gesture to have a survivor present here in the French Parliament and would have contributed in focusing the debates on the essential issue: why was the population of Srebrenica left to their murderers?

…In order to reply to your questions I feel it important to underline my convictions once again on the tragedy of Srebrenica.

The fall as well as the massacres of Srebrencia were foreseeable.

The promise of protection made to the inhabitants of Srebrencia was not kept and the lack of political will to defend them contributed in leading them to the massacre. They were abandoned.

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, doctors without borders, genocide, medecins sans frontieres, pierre salignon, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA SCHMITZ & DANIEL O’BRIEN (DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS)

December 16, 2008 4 comments

“…The sound of a truck horn blaring down the hill announced the arrival of the first casualties at the hospital. They were children, hit while playing in the park in the town center. One boy was already dead – decapitated – and the other children had horrific shrapnel wounds. – Médecins Sans Frontières

PHOTO (click photo for higher resolution): Forensic anthropologists Ewa Klonowski (right) and Piotr Drukier examine the partially preserved hands of a teenage boy, found in a mass grave of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide. Photo by Sara Terry – a former staff correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. “I hate exhumations. I hate the smell, the muck of the pit, the horror of decomposing bodies, the thoughts that stream through my mind about what it must have been like for these people in the final frightening moments of their life. Most of all, I hate the hatred that put them there,” she said.

Here are excerpts from a testimony presented by Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) volunteers – a German nurse Christina Schmitz and an Australian medical doctor Daniel O’Brien (During the French Parliamentary Hearing into the Srebrenica Tragedy, 2001):

Approximately 40,000 people, of whom most were displaced, lived in the enclave since March 1993 when General Morillon declared Srebrenica a security zone and promised the population protection under the United Nations. Living conditions were oppressive; it felt like being in an open-air prison or a ghetto, with people completely depending on humanitarian aid which often did not arrive sufficiently. Only the bare minimum of food, drugs and relief items was allowed in by Bosnian Serbian authorities. Living under the constant threat of an attack, deprived of their freedom and with an uncertain future, it was a pure matter of survival over many years.

Daniel and I met on June 28 with Commander Tom Karremans [Thomas Karremans] of UNPROFOR, who specifically assured us that the enclave would never fall.

In the afternoon [Thursday, July 6 1995] the sound of a truck horn blaring down the hill announced the arrival of the first casualties at the hospital. They were children, hit while playing in the park in the town center. One boy was already dead – decapitated – and the other children had horrific shrapnel wounds. We went to work with the local hospital staff to treat the wounded. By the end of the day, we had received 13 wounded and 4 dead at the hospital, all civilians from town.

By telex we requested assistance from UNPROFOR for one severely injured young girl, which was declined due to a stated “lack of intensive care capacity and material.” Also some promised blood transfusions for a patient were refused.

During the day [Friday, July 7 2995], seven injured civilians arrived at the hospital. [Of them], five required major interventions and three died within 12 hours [of their arrival].

Dr. Elias Pilav, the Srebrenica hospital surgeon, was tired and at the edge of a breakdown [Saturday, July 8 1995]… Not only was the work overwhelming, but the hospital was exposed to the shelling. In addition, those who were being maimed and killed before them were their
own family and friends.

Heavy shelling continued throughout the day [Sunday, July 9 1995], and the hospital remained busy. At one stage, casualties arrived after a shell fell into a room full of people in the town… After four days of heavy shelling, the Bosnian Serbian forces were on the verge of entering Srebrenica without a clear opposition from UNPROFOR troops.

The hospital became very crowded with new wounded [Monday, July 10 1995], and many people screaming and crying. According to UNPROFOR, despite of some shelling, the situation in the enclave was stable. Around 10:30 a.m., a shell exploded close to the hospital, shattering the windows of the operating theater and the pharmacy. Now the town’s hospital had became a target as well…. Dr. Elias Pilav, the hospital surgeon, requested assistance from the UNPROFOR medical teams. The understaffed Bosnian surgical team was operating around the clock in the Srebrenica hospital and needed help. I sent a telex at the UNPROFOR base in Potocari. The refusal came back by telex a few minutes later, declining assistance with the argument, that “medical care has to be secured for my soldiers…”

In the evening rumors spread that the Bosnian Serb army had entered the southern end of town… People intensely believed that if they fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serbian soldiers they would be killed. The fear was palpable… They begged us to get on our radio and tell the world what was happening… “The UN promised to protect us,” they said, “please get them to do
something before it is too late.”

It seemed now people had lost faith in the UNPROFOR protection… At noon [Tuesday, July 11 1995] the quiet was broken by the resumption of shelling. People started to panic and run north towards Potocari. The UNPROFOR told us that they had requested airstrikes and to be ready.

The mayor of Srebrenica entered our bunker and informed us that the Bosnian Serb army had entered the town. However only at around 3 p.m. did we see planes carrying out airstrikes. By then, the town was already empty of people and the Bosnian Serb army was well advanced into the town… The scene on the road to Potocari was complete chaos; people running in panic, carrying screaming children and their bags; blue helmets walking with the fleeing population; shelling continuing from the mountains… However UNPROFOR refused MSF any of their medicines because it had to be kept for their own soldiers. I had only the supplies of the two emergency cases from our cars: two bags of intravenous fluid and a few vials of painkiller.

Outside the compound, approximately 20,000 people were seeking shelter around some destroyed buildings trying to escape the continuing shelling. UNPROFOR accepted an estimated 5,000 people inside their base at Potocari, where they were protected from the shells and out of view of Bosnian Serb soldiers.

Only later in the morning [Wednesday, July 12 1995], UNPROFOR soldiers received the order to switch to a non combat situation as they were no longer under threat of attack. Therefore they offered us access to all their medical facilities and drugs.

The condition of the displaced people outside and inside was appalling – [they lacked] food, water, shelter, and sewage [was on the ground]. We were informed that Mladic would start the deportation of the population to Tuzla, and the evacuation of wounded people to Bratunac football stadium [where they were later tied, blindfolded, and then massacred]. I personally talked to him and tried to protest against this plan, but he just told me to do my job and walked away… It was so quick and well organized that it looked as if it was planed in advance. Outside the UN compound, men had to register in a house where 35 were kept. I expressed my concern to Deputy Commander Franken and he assured me that they were being well treated. I also discussed this issue with Commander Karremans who was very sure that none of the men were killed. However, later, around this house, I could hear a lot of small arm fire.

Around 7 p.m., the evacuation of the hospital patients who had been waiting in the UNPROFOR base for two days started in vehicles driven by UNPROFOR soldiers. It was very chaotic; everybody wanted to get on the convoy because they saw it as a chance for salvation. It is hard to convey their desperation, but people just jumped into the trucks, others carried their relatives forward via any available means and demanded they be placed on the convoy. It was accompanied by nine Bosnian nurses and one medical technician.

At 7 a.m. [Thursday, July 13] the deportation of the civilians resumed from the camp outside… Everybody who could have stopped this mass exodus, should have been forced to feel the panic and desperation of the people. Everybody should have seen the violence in the faces of Bosnian Serb soldiers, directing the people like animals to the buses, with children screaming in the arms of their mothers, everybody running for their lives.

A father with his one year-old baby came to me, crying, accompanied by an armed Bosnian serb soldier. It was clear to me that he was supposed to be separated and so he handed his child to me. It was a horrible scene. I had to write down the name of the child and felt that the father would never see his daughter again.

Later on, I was informed by a UNPROFOR soldier that there were dead bodies in the back of the factory… In the afternoon I saw a hysterical Bosnian man being beaten up… Since their arrival in Potocari, seven women gave birth in the corridor that was our hospital, with no privacy, among the dirt and desperation.

By 4 p.m., the outside camp was empty and the deportation of the displaced people from inside the UNPROFOR compound commenced… We were told that outside the compound, they were taken by Bosnian Serb soldiers who separated the men from the women, children, and elderly and were put on separate buses and trucks. In two days, the deportation of the 25,000 people was completed… I found three patients in the social center and three patients in the hospital. We heard lots of small arms fire in the late evening in one certain place in the forest nearby.

A UNPROFOR convoy arrived in the evening [Friday, July 14 1995] with new drugs, food and 35,000 liters of diesel… The Bosnian Serbian army confiscated 30.000 liters and kept the material!

I inquired with deputy commander Franken [Saturday, July 15 1995] about the whereabouts of the men and he informed me that some young men had arrived in Kladanj and apparently, there was a group of 700 to 1,000 men kept in Bratunac [football stadium].

Commandant [Momir] Nikolic, the local Bosnian Serb commander from Bratunac insisted on inspecting [interrogating] each of the 55 patients [Monday, July 17 1995] before they could be evacuated with ICRC to Tuzla. He went from bed to bed in the hospital talking to almost every patient. Leaving the hospital, Nikolic had written seven names on a piece of paper and informed everybody that these seven men had to stay in Bratunac in the local clinic…

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Editorial Note: Momir Nikolic, mentioned in the testimony above, was sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment on December 2, 2003 for his involvement in the crimes against humanity during Srebrenica genocide. To avoid Srebrenica genocide conviction, Nikolić admitted in a plea bargain that he was involved in coordinating and organizing the Bosnian Serb army operation aimed to forcibly expell thousands of civilians from the U.N. “Safe Haven” enclave during the Srebrenica genocide. The sentence was reduced from 27 years imprisonment to 20 years by the ICTY Appeals Chamber on March 8, 2006. Nikolic was transferred to Finland to serve his sentence on 11 April 2007.

*************

“Dutchbat soldiers told the MSF team about corpses lying near their compound. In the Ministry of Defence debriefing report, various Dutch soldiers say that bodies had been seen or that they had witnessed events that made them fear the worst. Some Dutchbat soldiers also provided horrifying eyewitness accounts when they arrived in Zagreb at the end of July… With so much intelligence pointing to an orchestrated deportation and massacre, it is incomprehensible that Dutchbat had no knowledge of the events unfolding around them.” (Srebrenica: Questions for the Future, Médecins Sans Frontières Holland, 4 April 2002).

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, christina schmitz, daniel o'brien, doctors without borders, genocide, medecins sans frontieres, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

NASER ORIC: CASE INFORMATION FACT SHEET

December 15, 2008 Comments off

PHOTO: Naser Orić, former Senior Commander of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in charge of defending the Srebrenica enclave from the Bosnian Serb attacks in the period of 1992 until the fall of the Srebrenica enclave in 1995.

The ultra-nationalist Serbian sources, led by notorious Srebrenica genocide denier Milivoje Ivanisevic, have been using discredited and grossly inflated numbers of Serb victims around Srebrenica to vilify Naser Orić and “prove” that Bosniak people he defended deserved to die in July 1995. But, as the Oric judgment makes clear, the facts do not support the equivalence thesis. There can never be any equivalence or comparison between the individual war crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs and the monstrous crime of genocide committed against the Bosniak population of the former United Nations ‘safe area’ enclave of Srebrenica. As the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded:

“Any criminal responsibility of Naser Orić was offset by the real and present necessity to acquire food for the survival of the population of Srebrenica. Having recognised that the defence of necessity was an established principle in customary international law in 1992 and 1993, the Trial Chamber considered the extraordinary humanitarian circumstances in Srebrenica at the time. It thus found that there was abundant evidence that Srebrenica was isolated, that the starving population was drastically increasing with the influx of refugees and that there had been repeated calls for help.”

NASER ORIC
Found: NOT GUILTY

Born: 3 March 1967, in the village of Potočari, municipality of Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Indictment: Initial: confirmed on 28 March 2003, made public on 11 April 2003; second amended: 4 October 2004; third amended: 30 June 2005 in accordance with Rule 98bis decision of 8 June 2005
Arrested: 10 April 2003, by the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR)
Transferred to ICTY: 11 April 2003
Initial and further appearances: 15 April 2003, pleaded not guilty to all counts of the indictment
Trial Chamber Judgment: 30 June 2006, sentenced to two years’ imprisonment; immediate release ordered on 30 June 2006 (he was entitled to credit for time served in detention since 10 April 2003 and was released on 1 July 2006)
Appeals Chamber Judgement: 3 July 2008, found not guilty

STATISTICS

Trial days : 196
Witnesses called by Prosecution: 52
Prosecution exhibits: 625
Witnesses called by Defence: 30
Defence exhibits: 1024
Witnesses called by Trial Chamber: 1
Chamber exhibits: 7

TRIAL

Commenced: 6 October 2004
Closing arguments: 3-10 April 2006
Trial Chamber II: Judge Carmel Agius (presiding), Judge Hans Henrik Brydensholt and Judge Albin Eser
Counsel for the Prosecution: Jan Wubben, Patricia Sellers Viseur, Gramsci di Fazio, Joanne Richardson, Jose Doria
Counsel for the Defence: Vasvija Vidović, John Jones
Judgement: 30 June 2006

APPEALS

Appeals Chamber: Judge Wolfgang Schomburg (presiding), Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Judge Liu Daqun, Judge Andrésia Vaz , Judge Theodor Meron
Counsel for the Prosecution: Michele Jarvis, Christine Dahl, Paul Rogers, Laurel Baig, Nicole Lewis, Najwa Nabti
Counsel for the Defence: Vasvija Vidović, John Jones
Judgement: 3 July 2008

INDICTMENT AND CHARGES

The initial indictment against Naser Orić was confirmed on 28 March 2003 and made public on 11 April 2003. Pursuant to the Trial Chamber Decision of 3 July 2003, the Prosecution filed an amended indictment on 16 July 2003. On 4 October 2004, the Trial Chamber ordered that the second amended indictment filed by the Prosecution on 1 October 2004 was the operative indictment against the accused. Following the decision by the Trial Chamber of 8 June 2005, in accordance with Rule 98bis, the Prosecution filed the third amended indictment on 30 June 2005. This was the operative indictment prior to the presentation of the defence case.

According to the indictment, in May 1992 Naser Orić was appointed commander of the Srebrenica Municipal Territorial Defence (TO) Staff, which was later re-named the Srebrenica Armed forces. His command was further extended when he was appointed the commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the sub-region Srebrenica in early November 1992 encompassing the geographical regions of several municipalities, namely: Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Zvornik in eastern Bosnia.

The indictment generally alleged that, at all times relevant to the charges of the indictment, by virtue of his position and authority as commander, Naser Orić commanded all units that were operating within his area of responsibility. This included all units in combat activities in the municipalities of Srebrenica and Bratunac in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the combat activities in Ratkovići on 21 and 27 June 1992, Ježestica on 8 August 1992, Fakovići on 5 October 1992, Bjelovac between 14 and 19 December 1992 and Kravica on 7 and 8 January 1993 and all units including the military police involved in the detention and custody of Serb individuals in Srebrenica.

According to the indictment, Naser Orić demonstrated both de jure and de facto command and control in military matters and exercised effective control over his subordinates.

Between 24 September 1992 and 20 March 1993, members of the military police under the command and control of Naser Orić, allegedly detained several Serb individuals in the Srebrenica police station and in the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal building. It was alleged that these detainees were subjected to physical abuse, serious suffering and injury to body and health. In some instances, prisoners were beaten to death.

Naser Orić, from about September 1992 to August 1995, knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to plan, prepare or execute the imprisonment, killing and/or cruel treatment of Serbs detained at the Srebrenica police station and the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal building, or had done so, and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

The indictment further alleged that during the period May 1992 to February 1993, Bosniak armed units engaged in various military operations against the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) in eastern Bosnia. In the course of such operations, Bosniak armed units in the municipalities of Bratunac, Srebrenica and Skelani, burnt and otherwise destroyed a minimum of 50 predominantly Serb villages and hamlets. As a result, thousands of Serb individuals fled the area.

Naser Orić was charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (Article 7(1) of the Statute) and on the basis of superior criminal responsibility (Article 7(3) of the Statute) with:

• Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, not justified by military necessity (violations of the laws or customs of war, Article 3).

He was charged on the basis of superior criminal responsibility (Article 7(3) of the Statute) with:

• Murder and cruel treatment (violations of the laws or customs of war, Article 3).

TRIAL

The trial commenced on 6 October 2004 before Trial Chamber II, Judge Carmel Agius (presiding), Judge Hans Henrik Brydensholt and Judge Albin Eser. The Prosecution completed its case-in-chief on 31 May 2005. On 8 June 2005, the Trial Chamber issued an oral decision pursuant to Rule 98bis. The defence began presenting its case on 4 July 2005 and concluded on 1 February 2006. The closing arguments of the Prosecution were presented on 3 and 4 April and of the Defence 5 ,6 , 7 and 10 April 2006.

RULE 98bis DECISION

After the conclusion of the presentation of Prosecution evidence, the Trial Chamber can rule of whether there is a case to answer. If the Chamber believes that the Prosecution has not presented sufficient evidence to prove certain charge(s), it can dismiss those charges before the beginning of the presentation of defence evidence.

Rule 98bis was amended on 8 December 2004 and the decision in the Orić case was the first application of the amended rule. The new procedure is entirely oral, and it is no longer party driven. Thus, it is much quicker. The Trial Chamber found that the standard of review remains the same, namely whether the Prosecution’s evidence, if believed, is sufficient for any reasonable trier of fact to find that guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In its Rule 98bis ruling, the Trial Chamber found that there was evidence which, if believed, would be capable of proving that the general legal requirements for the application of Article 3 are met, namely that:

• an armed conflict existed between 10 June 1992 and 20 March 1993 on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
• there was a nexus between the acts of Naser Orić and such armed conflict;
• the crimes of murder, cruel treatment, wanton destruction and plunder constitute violations of rules of international customary law which protect important values and entail individual criminal responsibility; and that
• regarding the crimes of murder and cruel treatment, the persons alleged to have been killed or subjected to cruel treatment were persons taking no active part in the hostilities at the relevant time.

The Trial Chamber elaborated on the applicable law in relation to both the underlying crimes and criminal responsibility.

Having considered all the evidence presented by the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber entered a judgement of acquittal of Naser Orić of the charges against him in Counts 4 and 6 of the second amended indictment, namely the charge of plunder of public or private property, a violation of the laws and customs of war. More specifically, the indictment charged Naser Orić only with the plunder of “cattle, furniture and television sets”. The Trial Chamber found that there was very little evidence pertaining to the plunder of furniture and TV sets and thus that the evidence adduced did not fulfil the jurisdictional requirement of Article 1 of the Statute, namely the requirement that the violations be serious.

While the Trial Chamber held that there was ample evidence which, if believed, could lead to the conclusion that several hundred heads of cattle were appropriated during or immediately after the attacks, it found that any criminal responsibility of Naser Orić was offset by the real and present necessity to acquire food for the survival of the population of Srebrenica. Having recognised that the defence of necessity was an established principle in customary international law in 1992 and 1993, the Trial Chamber considered the extraordinary humanitarian circumstances in Srebrenica at the time. It thus found that there was abundant evidence that Srebrenica was isolated, that the starving population was drastically increasing with the influx of refugees and that there had been repeated calls for help.

The Trial Chamber noted that there was no evidence that the taking away of cattle was disproportionate or that the direct perpetrators of the appropriation of cattle had brought about the humanitarian situation themselves, but rather that these acts had become indispensable for the survival of the population of Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber thus held that the Prosecution failed to adduce evidence capable of supporting a conviction for the crime of plunder of public or private property and consequently acquitted Naser Orić of Counts 4 and 6 of the second amended indictment.

The Trial Chamber ordered the continuation of the case against Naser Orić in relation to the other counts in the indictment, namely Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5.

However, with regard to the alleged murder of Bogdan Živanović in Count 1 and the alleged cruel treatment of Miloje Obradović in Count 2, the Trial Chamber found that there was no evidence capable of supporting a conviction and that Naser Orić consequently did not need to address these alleged incidents. Similarly, with regard to the alleged wanton destruction in the villages of Radijevići and Božići set out in Counts 3 and 5, the Trial Chamber found that there was no evidence capable of supporting a conviction and that Naser Orić therefore does not need to address those alleged incidents during the Defence case.

For practical purposes, the Trial Chamber asked the Prosecution to present an amended version of the indictment to reflect the above mentioned findings. The third amended indictment was filed on 30 June 2005.

TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGEMENT

This judgement deals with crimes of murder and cruel treatment of prisoners and of wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages alleged to have happened in Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993 for which the Accused was indicted on 30 June 2005.

After Srebrenica was re-captured by Bosnian Muslims in May 1992, they felt a pressing need to organise an effective defence. On 20 May 1992, an informal group of Bosnian Muslim men, who had already set up individual fighting groups in the area, met in the nearby hamlet of Bajramovici to establish the “Srebrenica TO Staff”. The Accused, who was present during this meeting, was elected as Commander. His appointment was subsequently confirmed by Sefer Halilović, Chief of the Supreme Command Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by Alija Izetbegović, the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 3 September 1992, the Srebrenica TO Staff was re-named the Srebrenica Armed Forces Staff.

Between 24 September and 16 October 1992, and again from 27 December 1992 to 20 March 1993, a number of Serbs were captured by Bosnian Muslim fighters and detained at the Srebrenica Police Station and, during the second time-period, also at a building behind the Srebrenica municipal building (“Building”). While they were generally exposed to the same appalling living conditions as the local population, their condition was significantly exacerbated by the maltreatment.

From the very moment it detained prisoners, the Srebrenica military police assumed all duties and responsibilities (under international law) relating to the treatment of prisoners in time of conflict. Evidence showed that Mirzet Halilović, the commander of the military police until 22 November 1992, did not exercise adequate supervision of the detention facility or the activities of the guards while carrying out their duties. To the contrary, Mirzet Halilović even contributed to the cruel treatment of the Serb detainees. The replacement of Mirzet Halilović with Atif Krdzić on 22 November 1992 did not benefit the detainees. Not one person or document refers to his presence in either of the two buildings where prisoners were kept. In addition, during his term as commander, more murders and cruel treatment took place. The Trial Chamber found that the Srebrenica military police, through its commanders Mirzet Halilović and Atif Krdzić, was responsible for the injuries inflicted on the victims.

The Trial Chamber also found that Naser Orić exercised effective control over the military police but only as of 22 November 1992. Prior to this date, it is not clear whether the Srebrenica Armed Forces Staff and Naser Orić as Commander exercised effective control over the military police. It is clear, however, that there was an attempt to restructure and improve its performance in October and November 1992, such as with the replacement of Mirzet Halilović by Atif Krdzić. The new military police commander reported to Osman Osmanović, the Chief of Staff of the Srebrenica Armed Forces who reported to Naser Orić.

The Trial Chamber found insufficient reliable evidence that Naser Orić ever visited either of the two detention facilities between December 1992 and March 1993, when the second group of Serb prisoners was held there. Although Naser Orić was aware that Serbs were detained in Srebrenica, there is no indication that anyone kept him informed about their condition.

Nonetheless, since Naser Orić was aware that incidents of murder and cruel treatment had previously occurred, the Trial Chamber found that Naser Orić was put on notice that the security and the well-being of all Serbs detained from that time forward in Srebrenica was at risk, and that this issue needed to be adequately addressed and monitored. Naser Orić also knew that the severe malnutrition and the psychological effects of being under siege had severely affected the judgement of people in Srebrenica, several of whom behaved erratically. The Trial Chamber found that Naser Orić had reason to know about acts of murder and cruel treatment committed at the Srebrenica Police Station and the Building between 27 December 1992 and 20 March 1993.

However, the security and well-being of Serb prisoners disappear from Naser Orić’s agenda after an investigation into the alleged killing of a prisoner by Mirzet Halilović and his eventual replacement with Atif Krdzić. In his 2001 interview with the Office of the Prosecutor, Naser Orić is reported as stating that because of the deteriorating military situation, the detention of prisoners was not on his mind, as there were others responsible for it.

The Trial Chamber holds that, as a general rule, the treatment of prisoners in armed conflict, including their physical and mental condition, cannot be deemed less important than military considerations. however important they may be. As a general rule the person entrusted with the responsibility over prisoners is in a position to fulfil this obligation. It does not, and cannot, apply when there is the impossibility to act, or when it would be utterly unreasonable to expect one to act, as in the case of a life-threatening situation. In this case, the Trial Chamber found that Naser Orić, as a commander, could discharge such responsibilities by delegating part of them to a subordinate and enquiring from time to time, and in the absence of reports, at least require them in whatever format.

The Trial Chamber found it unacceptable that commanders, like Naser Orić, could be free of his obligation to protect prisoners from murder and cruel treatment simply by assigning a subordinate to the job and not enquiring further about their status. Naser Orić never enquired about the fate of the Serb prisoners kept at the two detention facilities in Srebrenica from the day Atif Krdzić was appointed commander of the Srebrenica military police in lieu of Mirzet Halilović. In addition, he expressed and explained his lack of further involvement on the basis of his military commitments elsewhere and that there were others in charge of prisoners.

The Trial Chamber rejected the Defence submission that Naser Orić had inadequate means at the time to prevent the crimes committed against the prisoners. The replacement of Mirzet Halilović and the investigation of his alleged killing of a Serb prisoner show that this could be achieved, even in the absence of sophisticated structures and well-trained personnel.
The Trial Chamber therefore found Naser Orić guilty of not taking the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crimes at the Srebrenica Police Station and the Building between December 1992 and March 1993.

However, with respect to the duty to punish, the Trial Chamber came to a different conclusion, namely that Naser Orić could not be held responsible for having failed to punish the crimes committed. The Judgement explains why the Trial Chamber comes to the conclusion that there is insufficient evidence of effective control over the military police prior to 22 November 1992, when Naser Orić had actual knowledge of murder and cruel treatment. Thereafter, when Naser Orić exercised effective control, the Trial Chamber only found that he had reason to know of the crimes. Naser Orić could not be found guilty of failing to punish his subordinates for crimes, since there was not enough evidence to prove that he knew or could have known that the crimes had taken place and would therefore have been in a position to punish.

Weighing Naser Orić’s individual criminal responsibility in respect of the attack on Jezestica on 7 and 8 January 1993, the Trial Chamber found that the elements of the crime of wanton destruction are not fulfilled with regard to the other attacks for which such responsibility has been charged.

The Trial Chamber was convinced that Naser Orić was generally aware that Bosnian Serb property was destroyed by Bosnian Muslims, primarily civilians, who followed the fighters during attacks. However, the Prosecution failed to prove that he instigated wanton destruction. On the contrary, evidence indicated that Naser Orić opposed this conduct.

With respect to aiding and abetting, the Trial Chamber found that Naser Orić, as a leader of a group of fighters, had the responsibility to prevent reckless destruction by his subordinates. This duty extended to preventing wanton destruction by other fighters and civilians if Naser Orić knew that such reckless destruction was being or was about to be committed in the course of attacks in which his subordinates participated. As a minimum, he had a duty to prevent civilians from being present during such attacks. However, the Trial Chamber did not establish that Naser Orić could have prevented unjustified destruction by civilians that were present before, during and after attacks in massive numbers and who were beyond any control. With respect to fighters, the Trial Chamber was not convinced that in the particular circumstances of the attack on Jezestica on 7 and 8 January 1993, Naser Orić could have prevented fighters from committing destruction, or aiding and abetting civilians to commit such destruction. There was no evidence that his fighting group had any involvement in the wanton destruction that occurred during the attack. There was also insufficient evidence that Naser Orić had control over, or even communication with other fighting groups during the attack. In addition, although Naser Orić participated in the attack, there was no evidence that his presence was that of an ‘approving spectator’ required to hold him individually criminally responsible in light of the above, the Trial Chamber concluded that the Prosecution failed to establish that Naser Orić in any way instigated or aided and abetted the commission of wanton destruction not justified by military necessity in Jezestica on 7 and 8 January 1993.

The Trial Chamber examined Naser Orić’s criminal responsibility for his subordinates only in respect of the attacks on Ratkovici and Gornji Ratkovici (21 June 1992), on Braðevina (27 June 1992) and Jezestica (8 August 1992 and 7 and 8 January 1993). Regarding all four attacks, the Trial Chamber heard evidence that Bosnian Muslim fighters and civilians committed acts of wanton destruction, but there was almost no evidence that would further identify those perpetrators. However, such identification is not required by law, provided that it can be established that those responsible were under the control of the superior.

With respect to the question of the existence or otherwise of effective control by Naser Orić over the perpetrators it has already been explained that effective control can be based on legal, as well as on a factual position of authority.

However, while the Trial Chamber found that Naser Orić exercised effective control over his own fighting group from Potočari, a village located aproximately four kilometres northeast of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber did not find enough evidence that Naser Orić in fact exercised effective control over the various groups of fighters who participated in these attacks. There was no organised army with a fully functioning command structure, but one of local groups remaining relatively independent and voluntary and a mass of uncontrollable civilians that were present at every attack. Therefore, the Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that regarding all four attacks under consideration, Naser Orić could not be held criminally responsible for his subordinates’ acts of wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, which were not justified by military necessity.

On 30 May 2006, the Trial Chamber rendered its judgement: Naser Orić, on the basis of superior criminal responsibility (Article 7(3) of the Statute), was found guilty of:

• Failure to discharge his duty as a superior to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence of murder between 27 December 1992 to 20 March 1993 (violation of the laws or customs of war, Article 3)

• Failure to discharge his duty as a superior to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence of cruel treatment between 27 December 1992 and 20 March 1993 (violation of the laws or customs of war, Article 3)

He was acquitted of all the other counts.

Sentence: two years’ imprisonment

Naser Orić was entitled to credit for time spent in detention, namely three years, two months and 21 days. The Trial Chamber therefore ordered his immediate release.

APPEALS CHAMBER JUDGEMENT

On 31 July 2006, the defence filed a notice of appeal against the Trial Judgement. The Prosecution also filed its notice of appeal on 31 July 2006.

On 16 October 2006, the defence filed its appeal brief. On 18 October 2006, the Prosecution filed the latest version of its appeal brief.

The appeals hearing took place on 1 and 2 April 2008.

The Appeals Chamber granted Naser Orić’s first and fifth grounds of appeal as he alleged therein that the Trial Chamber failed to make findings on the criminal responsibility of his only identified subordinate, Atif Krdžić. Additionally, the Trial Chamber failed to determine whether Naser Orić knew or had reason to know that Atif Krdžić was about to or had committed crimes. In the absence of these findings, Naser Orić’s convictions under Article 7(3) of the Statute could not stand. These errors therefore invalidated the Trial Chamber’s decision to convict Naser Orić for his failure to prevent his subordinate’s alleged criminal conduct in relation to the crimes committed against Serb detainees between December 1992 and March 1993.

The Appeals Chamber found that the Prosecution, in its first ground of appeal, failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber misapplied the burden of proof or erred in failing to consider that Naser Orić’s de jure command over the Military Police between 24 September and 16 October 1992 created a presumption that he exercised effective control over that unit. For reasons explained in its Judgement, the Appeals Chamber further found that the Prosecution failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in fact when it found that Naser Orić did not have effective control over the Military Police between 24 September and 16 October 1992.

Under the last part of its first ground of appeal, the Prosecution alleged that, had the Trial Chamber applied the “had reason to know” standard correctly, it would have concluded that Naser Orić had reason to know that crimes of murder and cruel treatment had occurred between 27 December 1992 and 20 March 1993, and convicted him for failing to punish. The Appeals Chamber noted that, whereas responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute requires proof of the superior’s knowledge or reason to know of his subordinate’s criminal conduct, the Prosecution contended that Naser Orić had reason to know that the crimes of murder and cruel treatment themselves had occurred. The Prosecution submitted that, in the present case, knowledge or reason to know of the crimes and knowledge or reason to know of the subordinate’s criminal conduct were “one and the same”. The Appeals Chamber considered that the Prosecution fails to substantiate this assertion and, consequently, needed not consider any further the Prosecution’s present sub-ground of appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, the Prosecution’s first ground of appeal was dismissed in its entirety. The Appeals Chambers declined to consider the Prosecution’s fifth ground of appeal and considered that the Prosecution’s remaining grounds of appeal were rendered moot as a result of the Appeals Chamber’s discussion and conclusion on Naser Orić’s appeal.

In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber found that the appropriate course of action can only be a reversal of Naser Orić’s convictions under Article 7(3) of the Statute.

The Appeals Chamber underscored that, like the Trial Chamber, it had no doubt that grave crimes were committed against Serbs detained in Srebrenica at the Srebrenica Police Station and the Building between September 1992 and March 1993. Also, the Defence did not challenge that crimes were committed against Serb detainees.
However, proof that crimes had occurred was not sufficient to sustain a conviction of an individual for these crimes.

On 3 July 2008, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber judgement and found Naser Orić not guilty.

Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen appended a declaration. Judge Liu Daqun appended a partially dissenting opinion and declaration. Judge Wolfgang Schomburg appended a separate and partially dissenting opinion.

Link to the original document prepared by the ICTY Communications Service (in PDF). All ICTY key documents are available on: www.un.org/icty International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Churchillplein 1, 2517 JW The Hague, the Netherlands.

Tags: bosniaks, bosnian muslims, genocide, naser oric, srebrenica, srebrenica genocide, srebrenica ghetto, srebrenica massacre

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