Archive
MONUMENT TO 1600 SARAJEVO CHILDREN KILLED BY SERBIAN TERRORISTS
PHOTO: Bosnian girls lay flowers at a newly inaugurated memorial to children of Sarajevo, Saturday, May 9, 2009. The memorial is dedicated to the children of Sarajevo who were killed by the Bosnian Serb troops during the 43-months siege of Bosnia’s capital during which more than 12,000 people, including more than 1,600 children, were killed.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted two Serb generals of numerous crimes against humanity, including on terror charges, in their conduct of the siege. Serb Gen. Stanislav Galic and Gen. Dragomir Milosevic were found guilty on terrorist charges and sentenced to life imprisonment and 33 years imprisonment, respectively.
The monument consists of a glass unfinished sand castle in the shape of a pyramid. It symbolises the play of children being cut short by death. The pyramid has partially been made from the spent cartridges that were found in the city after the war.
The Siege of Sarajevo is the longest siege of a capital city in the history of modern warfare. Serb forces of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and the Yugoslav People’s Army (later to become the Army of Serbia and Montenegro) besieged Sarajevo, the capital city of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from April 5, 1992 to February 29, 1996 during the Bosnian War.
PHOTO: Bosnian children throw flowers into the Miljacka river from a bridge where the first civilian victim of Sarajevo’s 1992-1995 siege was killed April 6, 2009. The Bosnian capital marks each April 6 as the anniversary date of the beginning of its devastating siege.
After Bosnia and Herzegovina had declared independence from Yugoslavia the Serbs – whose strategic goal was to create a new Serbian State of Republika Srpska (RS) that would include the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina – encircled Sarajevo with a siege force of 18,000 stationed in the surrounding hills, from which they assaulted the city with weapons that included artillery, mortars, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine-guns, multiple rocket launchers, rocket-launched aircraft bombs, and sniper rifles. From May 2, 1992, the Serbs blockaded the city.
The Bosnian government defence forces were poorly equipped and unable to break the siege. More than 12,000 civilians were killed during the Sarajevo siege. The three-and-a-half year war claimed at least 100,000 lives, and 2.2 million people were forced to flee.
DON’T MISS – Editor’s Picks:
(1.) General Lewis MacKenzie: Sarajevo Concentration Camp Rapist with Diplomatic Immunity
(2.) Translated Transcript of Genocide Prevention Ceremony in Sarajevo (2009)
(3.) VIDEO: Genocide Prevention Month in Sarajevo (2009)
(4.) United Nations Report: Serbs Responsible for 1995 Sarajevo Markale Market Massacre
(5.) VIDEO: Upcoming Genocide Conference in Sarajevo, Kathleen Young (2007)
(6. Serb Gen Stanislav Galic guilty of Sarajevo terrorism & markale massacre
(7.) U.N. Court rules Serbs responsible for 1994 Sarajevo’s markale massacre
(8.) U.N. Conclussions: Serbs responsible for 1995 Sarajevo’s markale massacre
(9.) Life Imprisonment for Sarajevo Terror: Serb Gen. Stanislav Galic Transfered to Germany
(10.) Milorad Trbic transfered to Sarajevo to stand Genocide Trial
(11.) Rupert Smith Markale Massacre Testimony in Front of the U.N Court: “No evidence Muslims shelled themselves”
(12.) David Harland Markale Massacre Testimony in Front of the U.N. Court: Witness Admits Responsibility for Neutral Statement Leading to Serbian Myths and Propaganda About Markale Massacre in Sarajevo
(13.) VIDEO: Christmas Eve in Sarajevo (2007)
(14.) Pictures of Beautiful Sarajevo, photo tour (2005)
(15.) Use Search Box in the left-hand top corner to find more in-depth research by Srebrenica Genocide Blog Team.
DAVID HARLAND RESPONSIBLE FOR REVISIONIST MARKALE MASSACRE MYTH
David Harland, former head of UN Civil Affairs in BH, admitted today he was responsible for the creation of the myth that UNPROFOR was unable to determine who had fired the mortar shells that caused the Markale 2 massacre on 28 August 1995. Forty-three people were killed and seventy-five injured at the entrance to the Town Market in Sarajevo.
Markale 2 is one of the 15 “illustrative examples” of the shelling campaign against Sarajevo listed in the indictment against the then commander of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, General Dragomir Milosevic.
The myth that has survived for more than ten years, Harland said in response to Milosevic’s defense counsel Branislav Tapuskovic, was created because of a “neutral statement” made by General Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR commander.
On the day when the second attack on Markale happened, General Smith stated “it is unclear who fired the shells, although at that time he already had the technical report of UNPROFOR intelligence section, determining beyond reasonable doubt that they were fired from VRS positions at Lukavica”.
Harland’s responsibility lies in the fact that he himself advised General Smith to make “a neutral statement in order not to alarm the Bosnian Serbs who would be alerted to the impending NATO air strikes against their positions had he pointed a finger at them”. That would have jeopardized the safety of UN troops in the territory under VRS control or on positions where they might have been vulnerable to retaliatory attacks by Serb forces.
In his cross-examination Harland denied claims made by Tapuskovic, Belgrade attorney, that between two and three thousand Serbs had “been killed, had their throats slit and been thrown into Kazani” during the war in Sarajevo .
Not denying the crimes committed against Serbs, and Bosniaks too, by Caco and his men, Harland categorically stated that “the huge majority of the Serbs killed in the town, inside the conflict lines, were killed by artillery and sniper fire originating from the positions of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps”.
This line of cross-examination prompted Presiding Judge Robinson to ask the defense counsel “what is the point of this defense, even if the figures you’re presenting are correct”. In other words: “what impact will it have on the responsibility of General Milosevic for the crimes he is charged with”. Tapuskovic’s reply was that Caco’s crimes had engendered great fear among the Serbs that the same thing could happen to them if they were to be under Bosniak power. They therefore “held the positions around Sarajevo firmly”.
While Tapuskovic claims that the Sarajevo Serbs “feared Caco more than bombs”, Harland believes that “the great majority of Serbs wanted to leave Sarajevo but couldn’t do so”. The reason why they wanted to leave town was “the siege and a great risk they ran of getting killed by shells or sniper fire from Serb positions”.
Louis Fortain took the stand after David Harland. Fortain, a lieutenant-colonel in the Canadian Army, was UNPROFOR’s liaison officer with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. He was stationed in the Lukavica barracks.
ICTY: SERBS RESPONSIBLE FOR 1994 SARAJEVO MARKALE MASSACRE
Milosevic Trial – The Hague – Court Room One
Day 273, 16 January 2004.
Bosnian Serbs Responsible for Sarajevo Markale Massacre, Expert Testifies
Update:
Serb General, Stanislav Galic, guilty for 1994 Sarajevo Markale Market MassacreBy: Judith Armatta
THE HAGUE – Berko Zecevic, an expert in designing ammunition who investigated the mortar shell that killed 68 and wounded 144 in Sarajevo’s Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994, concluded that the shell could only have come from the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) positions. His conclusion was presented in a report commissioned by the Office of the Prosecutor and introduced into evidence when he appeared in Court today.
The source of the 120 millimeter mortar shell that exploded in the middle of the busy market has been a matter of serious contention since it occurred. Initially, members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said the shell was fired from Bosnian Government positions. From that, some concluded that the Bosnian Government was firing on its own people, to make it appear they were victims of Bosnian Serb aggression and gain international sympathy and, ultimately, international intervention on their behalf. A later, more indepth UNPROFOR report, however, noted a calculation error in the first UN report. Correcting the error led the UN to conclude that it was impossible to say which side had fired the shell.
Mr. Zecevic testified that, when he heard on television that authorities were unable to determine the source of the projectile, he offered his services as an expert to the judge investigating the incident. Working with two colleagues, their analysis revealed the direction from which the shell was fired and six possible locations from which it could have been fired (5 under VRS control and 1 under ABH (Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) control). The site under ABH control was clearly visible to UNPROFOR personnel, who reported that no shell was fired from that position. The type of stabilizer fin (part of the projectile) found at the site was produced in one of two places, both under control of the VRS at the time. As a result of this and other technical measurements, Mr. Zecevic concluded the shell could only have come from one of the positions under VRS control.
While Mr. Zecevic’s experience and expertise in ammunition design and testing was impressive, the Accused questioned his objectivity based on his having worked for the ABH until shortly before the massacre. Mr. Zecevic insisted he conducted a professional and objective analysis, which was fully supported by facts and calculations that could be checked by any expert in the field. He added that his assistance to the ABH ended in July of the previous year. Before that, he worked for 17 years in the Research and Development Section of a major munitions factory in Bosnia. The factory was part of the former federal Yugoslavia’s interdependent military-industrial complex. When the JNA dissolved, the system was reorganized and Mr. Zecevic left.
An earlier witness, former UN officer David Howland, told the Court that UN investigations could not determine the source of the particular shell that exploded in the Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994, but UN records showed that almost 100% of shells landing on the ABH side of the confrontation line were fired by the VRS. He also testified that, while the BHA sometimes provoked fire at civilian targets, it did not fire on its own people (the citizens of Sarajevo of all ethnicities).
During his cross examination, Milosevic read out a portion of the dissenting opinion in the Galic trial, where Judge Nieto-Navia concluded that the prosecution in that case had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb forces were responsible for the shell that exploded in the Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994. He found support for his conclusion in the Special UN Team’s official findings communicated to the UN Security Council that “there is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party fired the mortar bomb.” As Judge May noted, that is one judge’s view and nothing more. He might also have pointed out that the majority in the Galic case found beyond a reasonable doubt that the shell was deliberately fired from VRS-controlled territory, after extensively reviewing expert opinions, including Mr. Zecevic’s and the UN’s, as well as eye witness evidence.
The conclusions in the Galic trial are not binding on the judges in the Milosevic trial. Here, as there, the judges will have to make a thorough review and analysis of all evidence submitted — by both the Prosecution and Defence — before making up their own minds. The question remains whether the matter will ever be finally resolved.
Mr. Zecevic also provided expert testimony that the source of significant quantities and types of ammunition used by the VRS against the citizens of Sarajevo came from Serbia. His conclusion was based on an analysis of unexploded ordnance in Sarajevo. The Prosecution produced numerous documents, showing that Mr. Zecevic’s former factory, military production enterprises in Serbia, the JNA/VJ and the VRS/RS took over and adapted the former federal Yugoslav military production network. Under it, as a number of the documents showed, Serbia and the JNA and its successor the VJ supplied weapons, ammunition and needed raw materials to the Bosnian Serbs. This practice violated the UN arms embargo. And, as Mr. Zecevic told the Court, “[I]t means that the country [Serbia/FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] was directly taking part in the killing of people who were unarmed,” i.e. the citizens of Sarajevo where the unexploded ordnance was found. The documents, together with Mr. Zecevic’s testimony, add yet more corroboration that Serbia was supporting the war by the RS against the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Prosecution has long since succeeded in establishing that Serbia supplied the Bosnian Serbs with significant quantities of weapons and military equipment without which they could not have waged war. Milosevic faces a formidable task to discredit this evidence.
keywords: ICTY, International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Berko Zecevic, UNPROFOR, Sarajevo Markale Marketplace Massacre, Markale Marketplace Massacre Sarajevo, Sarajevo Markale Massacre, Markale Massacre, Markale Sarajevo Massacre, Srebrenica Genocide, Srebrenica Massacre, Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia-Herzegovina
UN REPORT: SERBS RESPONSIBLE FOR 1995 SARAJEVO MARKALE MASSACRE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session, Agenda item 42
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 November 1999, pages 94-95
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35
D. Attack on the Markale Marketplace in Sarajevo
439. On the day of the attack, the Force Commander based in Zagreb, who controlled the United Nations “key” to launch air attacks, was absent on personal business. The key had therefore passed temporarily to the UNPROFOR Commander in Sarajevo. The latter decided to initiate a request for NATO air strikes against the Serbs, calculating that force could be used to advantage. The goal of the “enforcement operation” would be to remove Serb weapons from within striking distance of the safe area of Sarajevo, and to lift the siege of the city. Two problems, however, prevented the UNPROFOR Commander from turning the key immediately. First, despite sustained efforts over two months to remove UNPROFOR troops from positions from which they could be taken hostage by Serb forces, a detachment of UNPROFOR troops was moving through Serb-held territory in eastern Bosnia, on its way out of Gora de. Second, UNPROFOR’s facilities in Sarajevo were, as ever, scattered across the floor of the valley in which Sarajevo lies, exposed to fire from Serb mortars and artillery in the surrounding hills.
440. The UNPROFOR Commander called Mladic to ensure that the movement of UNPROFOR troops out of Serb-held territory would not be hindered. Not wishing to arouse the Serbs’ suspicions, which could have led to the detention of the exposed UNPROFOR troops, the UNPROFOR Commander decided not to tell Mladic that UNPROFOR experts had confirmed that the mortar rounds had been fired by the Serbs, or that he was planning to launch an air campaign against the Serbs in response. Mladic was apparently satisfied, allowing the UNPROFOR unit in eastern Bosnia to proceed across the international border into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a manoeuvre which was completed in the same evening. Again concerned not to arouse Serb suspicions, the UNPROFOR Commander also made a statement to the press in which he was equivocal, both as to who had fired the mortar rounds and as to how UNPROFOR intended to respond. The press, and the Bosnian Government authorities, were, like Mladic, convinced that there would be no dramatic response to the massacre. The Government lodged a protest against what it described as the latest example of a pattern of UNPROFOR inaction.
441. The UNPROFOR Commander turned his key at approximately 2000 hours on 28 August, without consulting his superiors in the United Nations or any of the troop- contributing countries. (The Secretariat noted with concern that it had learned of the decision only six hours later, and had not yet received any information confirming responsibility for the mortar attack itself.) The UNPROFOR Commander did, however, speak several times with the Commander of NATO’s Southern Command, holder of the NATO key. The latter dispatched a message stating that, in the common judgement of the UNPROFOR Commander and himself, the conditions for the initiation of air strikes against the set of targets in the Sarajevo area had been met. He said that he and the UNPROFOR commander had agreed that air strikes would begin as soon as the weather and technical considerations allowed. He added that the air strikes would continue until, in the common judgement of the NATO and United Nations military commanders, the attacks on, or threat to, Sarajevo had ceased.
Related article:
http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com/2005/12/icty-serbs-responsible-for-1994.html
Srebrenica Massacre 