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ICTY: BOSNIAN SERBS WERE UNDER CONTROL OF BELGRADE
Update note, March 10, 2008: Thank you for your comments. I am moving excerpts of Owen’s comment (quoting the Judge Al-Khasawneh) on top:
“The ‘effective control’ test for attribution established in the Nicaragua case is not suitable to questions of State responsibility for international crimes committed with a common purpose. The ‘overall control’ test for attribution established in the Tadić case is more appropriate when the commission of international crimes is the common objective of the controlling State and the non-State actors. The Court’s refusal to infer genocidal intent from a consistent pattern of conduct in Bosnia and Herzegovina is inconsistent with the established jurisprudence of the ICTY. The FRY’s knowledge of the genocide set to unfold in Srebrenica is clearly established. The Court should have treated the Scorpions as a de jure organ of the FRY. The statement by the Serbian Council of Ministers in response to the massacre of Muslim men by the Scorpions amounted to an admission of responsibility. The Court failed to appreciate the definitional complexity of the crime of genocide and to assess the facts before it accordingly.”
Recently, Slobodan Kostic, a Serbian journalist from Belgrade, wrote an excellent article for IWPR titled How Belgrade Escaped Genocide Charge.
The article details some of the steps Serbia took to successfully block the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from disclosing extremely sensitive transcripts of meetings the Serbian Supreme Defence Council held between 1992 and 1995.
As Slobodan Kostic points out and we agree with him, quote:“It is widely believed that the transcripts, which record the meetings of top officials, contain evidence of Belgrade’s direct involvement in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s.”
PHOTO CAPTION: Photos of the Srebrenica Genocide billboard in Belgrade vandalized with the message threatening a repeat of Srebrenica genocide: ‘There’s going to be a rerun’.
The question remains: If one day victims get their way and Serbia makes sensitive transcripts public, will the authenticity of these transcripts be compromised in the meantime? 
After all, Serbia had plenty of time to forge whatever documents they wished. What stops Serbia and Republika Srpska from forging military orders so they comply with Geneva Convention?
It is important to note – and most people don’t realize this fact – the Prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal proved an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina no less than five times, confirming Serbia’s direct involvement in a full blown international attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is an excerpt of ICTY judgment confirming Belgrade’s full control over Bosnian Serbs (financial, logistical, and more importantly in direction, coordination and supervision of the activities of the Serb Army, VRS):
Tadic, (Appeals Chamber), July 15, 1999, paras. 156, 162: “It is sufficient to show that [the Yugoslav Army] exercised overall control over the Bosnian Serb Forces. Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and other assistance and support, but also, and more importantly, in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS [the Army ofthe Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republika Srpska]. This sort of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal criteria required by international law.” “[F]or the period material to this case (1992), the armed forces of the Republika Srpska were to be regarded as acting under the overall control of and on behalf of the FRY [the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)]. Hence, even after 19 May 1992 the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be classified as an international armed conflict.” See also Tadic, (Appeals Chamber), July 15, 1999, para. 87. [read more…]
Nevertheless, there was Genocide in Bosnia. While ICJ confirmed Srebrenica genocide, another European Court handed down Bosnian genocide judgment. It should be noted that on September 26th 1997, Germany handed down the first Bosnian Genocide conviction to Serb soldier Nikola Jorgic for crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In reviewing the case in the judgement of Nikola Jorgic v. Germany on 12 July 2007 the European Court of Human Rights upheld Bosnian Genocide conviction.
PEOPLE SAY YES FOR PEACE
United Nations Development Program – Research Results
Translated from
Oslobodjenje
Recently published results of UNDP‘s research in Sarajevo Oslobodjenje have shown that Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina want to live together, but don’t want to have close family ties.
According to this report, majority of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats are willing to share land with other ethnic groups, live with different ethnic groups in their neighbourhoods or send their kids to ethnically mixed schools. However, there is a very low percentage of people who are ready for ethnically mixed marriages.
According to the war-time statistics, there were 120,000 ethnically mixed marriages in Sarajevo alone. Today, 29.8% of Bosniaks on a territory where they form majority, approves marriages with Serbs; while 32.5% of Croats on a territory where they form majority approves ethnically mixed marriages with Serbs. On the other hand, 31.41% of Serbs where they form majority supported ethnic marriages with Croats, while 27.5% of them supported ethnic marriages with Bosniaks.
Interestingly, other minorities on all three ethnically diverse regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina support marriages with all three ethnic groups, including having family ties with “other” people; the exceptions were Bosniaks and Serbs who live on a territory with Croat majority.
Prof. Jusuf Ziga is not surprised by the results of this research.
“For me, these were expected, but also encouraging results.” – says Ziga and explains that considering recent past of Bosnia, the fact that around 30% of citizens is still ready for ethnically mixed marriages and many more for life together “indicates that the readiness to appreciate and accept others has survived despite all odds, and it is still alive as a social value.”
UNDP has concluded that Bosniaks are most ready than all to live together with other ethnic groups in all three ethnically diverse regions of Bosnia.
87.8% of Bosniaks are willing to live in same country with Serbs, and 94.8% of them with Croats.
76% of Croats are willing to share land with Serbs and Bosniaks.
58.9% Serbs are willing to live with Bosniaks and 60.9% with Croats in a territory where Serbs form majority.
Almost in equal percentage, Bosniaks want to have Serbs and Croats as neighbours, while percentage of Serbs who want other ethnic groups as neighbours is somewhat higher. Croats would rather share land where they form majority, than live with other ethnic groups in their neighbourhood.
When it comes to sending kids to same school with other ethnic groups, that number is even lower in Croats, although satisfactory: 66.5% of Croats approve sending their kids to same school with Serb children, while 63.5% of Croats are ready to send their kids to school with Bosniak children. Percentage of Serbs who are willing to school their children with children from other ethnic groups is somewhat smaller, however, 65% of Serbs do support mixed schools.
Consequences of Conflict
When the UNDP researchers asked citizens would they mind if their boss was of other ethnic background, the number of those who answered positively continued plunging. Bosniaks would rather have a Croat, then Serb boss. About 50% of Serbs would neither mind having a Croat, nor Bosniak boss.
Although differences are not huge, the research has shown that Serbs and Croats would rather share land, neighbourhood, school, and even a marriage among each other, then with a third ethnic group – Bosniaks.
Prof. Ziga finds reasons in religious differences, especially when it comes to marriages.
“The fact is that the consequences of conflicts can be felt even to day. And the fact is also that these conflicts were bigger among Bosniaks and Serbs, than they were among Serbs and Croats. But, although there are differences, it should not be forgotten that Serbs and Croats have same religious foundation and I am not surprised they have more readines for common marriage.
However, differences are minimal, even when it comes to this supersensitive question.” – says Prof. Ziga, who thinks that UNDP results show that BiH society has strength for revitalization, but they also have need for community living.”
Serbs – the most unattached to Bosnia-Herzegovina
While they wish to preserve common life among each other, ethnic groups have not developed enough feelings of attachment to common land. The exceptions were Bosniaks, while that feeling is somewhat weaker among Croats, and the weakest among Serbs – only 20% of them say they feel strong attachment to Bosnia. However, attachment to Bosnia among Serbs and Croats is much higher if they live in a community with Bosniaks.
Support for joining European Union
Serbs are more committed for European Union than to their own land. According to UNDP statistics, 61.4% of Serbs, 74.8% of Croats, and 88.4% of Bosniaks on territories where they form majority support Bosnia joining European Union. In 80% of cases other minorities expressed strong or somewhat strong support Bosnia joining European Union.
U.S. DEPORTS TWO SREBRENICA MASSACRE SUSPECTS TO BOSNIA
UNITED STATES DEPORTS TWO SERBS WANTED FOR SREBRENICA GENOCIDE
SARAJEVO – The United States deported to Bosnia two Bosnian Serbs wanted by a local court on charges of genocide committed in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, officials said.
“The United States authorities deported today two persons and handed them over to Bosnia-Hercegovina’s prosecutors’ office,” the prosecutors’ office said in a statement.
The statement identified the two only as Zdravko B. and Goran B. adding that they were “suspected of participation in war crimes and genocide committed in July 1995 in Srebrenica.” Their identities were revealed by the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are: Goran Bencun and Zdravko Bozic [source].
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a senior police officer told AFP that the two were “Bosnian Serbs” who were “handed over to Bosnian police at the Sarajevo airport around noon (1000 GMT).”
The US embassy here could not comment immediately.
The July 1995 Srebrenica massacre of over
8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces is the worst massacre in Europe since World War II and the first legally established case of genocide in Europe after the Holocaust.The atrocity became a symbol of brutality of Bosnia’s 1992-95 war, which claimed over 100,000 lives.
It was qualified as an act of genocide by the UN war crimes court in The Hague.
Eleven Bosnian Serbs are currently on trial before the Sarajevo-based Court of Bosnia-Hercegovina (
The Srebrenica massacre is at the center of genocide charges against Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic and his army commander Ratko Mladic, both wanted by the UN tribunal.
The two, believed to be hiding in Serb-controlled part of Bosnia and in Serbia, remain on the run almost 11 years since the Srebrenica massacre.
Related:
2. Chilling custody in immigrand fraud case (new update)
3. Butcher of Srebrenica wants his own admission kept silent
4. Elusive Justice: Marko Boskic, a man who gunned down 1,200 Srebrenica Bosniaks
5. Bush administration has no interest in prosecuting Srebrenica massacre suspects
6. Phoenix: Mecca for Srebrenica massacre fugitives
FOUR SREBRENICA MASSACRE SUSPECTS APPEAR IN COURT
On June 8th, four former members of the Bosnian Serb military appeared in federal court to face visa fraud charges, following an investigation by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) into allegations they failed to disclose their prior Bosnian Serb military service when they applied for immigration benefits, allowing them to relocate to the United States.
ICE agents arrested Milenko Stjepanovic, 55; Mirka Stjepanovic, 53; Ranko Nastic, 54; and Branko Ristic 46.
All four defendants, who currently live in the Salt Lake City area, are citizens of the former Yugoslavia, now Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Indictments unsealed allege that they made materially false statements on their immigration benefit applications, failing to disclose that they had served in the Bosnian Serb military during the Balkan conflicts between 1992 and 1995.
Because of the atrocities committed during the Balkan conflicts, Bosnians who seek refuge in the United States are required to declare all military service, including service in the Bosnian Serb Army, on immigration forms.
While under oath, the defendants allegedly did not reveal their prior military service with the Army of the Republika Srpska, or the Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS).
The VRS participated in human rights violations, including the Srebrenica massacre, which resulted in the capture and execution of over 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys (children) during 1995 – Europe’s worst civilian massacre since the Holocaust.
The Srebrenica massacre has been classified as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Individuals who have persecuted others are not admissible to the United States by law.
“We will not allow the United States to become a sanctuary for those using fraud and deception to qualify for refugee status,” said Joseph Romel, assistant special agent in charge for the ICE office of investigations in Utah.
“These individuals willfully concealed their prior service in the military and this raises serious questions about their basic claims to eligibility.”
Acting U.S. Attorney for Utah Stephen J. Sorenson emphasized that the indictments returned by a Utah grand jury do not allege the defendants committed war crimes in Bosnia, but that they were members of the Vojska Republike Srpske, the Bosnian Serb military, and soldiers in the Zvornik Brigade, which played a role at Srebrenica.
Sorenson said there have been some instances where VRS members admitted military service and, after careful review, were able to obtain status in the United States. When the military service is not disclosed, however, the review is not conducted.
“The failure of these defendants to list their military service on refugee applications and subsequent applications here in Utah to obtain permanent residency precluded proper and meaningful screenings of their cases,” Sorenson said.
“We believe the immigration status each of these defendants presently enjoys was obtained by fraud.”
Visa fraud carries a potential maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a fine of $250,000. The defendants are scheduled to stand trial in August.
Just in!
Custody ordered for two war crimes suspects
A preliminary proceeding judge of Section I for War Crimes of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) yesterday ordered custody of one month for Goran Bencun and Zdravko Bozic.
The Prosecutor’s Office of BiH suspects these two persons of participating, as members of the Republika Srpska Army, in the murders of Bosniak civilians from Srebrenica, in the area of Pilica in July 1995.
The authorities of the United States of America deported Bencun and Božić to BiH on 30 June 2006 for breaches of immigration regulations.
Related:
1. Chilling custody in immigrand fraud case (new update)
2. Butcher of Srebrenica wants his own admission kept silent
3. Elusive Justice: Marko Boskic, a man who gunned down 1,200 Srebrenica Bosniaks
4. Bush administration has no interest in prosecuting Srebrenica massacre suspects
5. Phoenix: Mecca for Srebrenica massacre fugitives
SREBRENICA MASSACRE ORCHESTRATORS MUST BE CAUGHT
STATEMENT BY TRIBUNAL’S PROSECUTOR CARLA DEL PONTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL 7 JUNE 2006
Points of Interest (blog editor’s picks):
1) The Prosecution has proven an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina no less than five times. This proves that there was no civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as previously thought, but a full blown international attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina by neighbouring Serbia.
2) An amendment to the Rules was adopted that would allow a Trial Chamber to direct the Prosecutor to cut counts in an indictment, which Mrs. Del Ponte justly refuses to do.
3) Serbia has the main responsibility to locate, arrest and transfer all six fugitives. The co-operation provided by Serbia to the ICTY has been and remains very difficult and frustrating.
4) Nobody is searching actively for primary orchestrators of Srebrenica massacre: Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. [Also see: $5,000,000 Reward posted by the US Justice Department for the capture of Radovan Karadzic and/or Ratko Mladic]
Excellencies,
Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to provide you with my assessment of the progress made in the completion strategy and to highlight the problems we continue to face. A written assessment was delivered already, and I intend to focus on the main issues.
A number of steps were taken internally to increase the efficiency of the Tribunal, while maintaining the highest standards expected from an international court created by the United Nations.
In this regard, I have proposed to join cases with a similar crime base. I have filed four motions for that purpose, and three were accepted by the Chambers. One trial with six accused has already begun. Later this year, a consolidated trial with nine accused charged with crimes committed in Srebrenica will start, as well as another one with six leading political and military figures indicted for crimes committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo.
My second initiative has been to propose the transfer of cases involving mid-and lower-level perpetrators. This undertaking was met with strong opposition from some victims’ groups. However, my assessment of the local judiciaries is that they are now capable of trying such cases. Beginning in September 2004, I have therefore filed 13 motions requesting the transfer of cases to the domestic jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia. There is no other case at the ICTY that could be transferred to the region, as, according to the criteria set by the Council, they all concern the most senior leaders responsible for the most serious crimes.
Thirdly, I have been working with the Judges in taking all possible measures to ensure that the Tribunal’s own process is as efficient as possible. I have put forward packages of reforms that, if implemented, would significantly accelerate the pre-trial and trial proceedings. Given the seriousness of the cases at the ICTY, it is essential to improve urgently pre-trial management, so that issues are narrowed before the trial starts so that the trial can focus on truly contested matters. Decisions on key issues must be made long before the beginning of the trial. For instance, it is important that a decision be rendered very soon on a motion regarding the disclosure of materials in electronic or hard copy that I filed in the Šešelj case over two years ago.
I have also proposed that a much more dynamic approach be taken on adjudicated facts. Such facts have been proven in previous trials, and the Chambers have the power to decide that they must not be proven again in a given trial. The instrument of the adjudicated facts is therefore a key tool to reduce the scope of the trials. For instance, the Prosecution has proven an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina no less than five times, wasting months and months on proving the same facts, sometimes with the same witnesses, in case after case. We have to prove it again, for the sixth time, in the on-going Prlić et al. trial.
I have also taken the lead in promoting the efficient use of time at trial. For example, in the Prlić et al. case, the Prosecution has put forward a 10 point plan to streamline the trial, within the time limit set by the President of the Trial Chamber, for the Prosecution and Defence respectively to present their cases and cross-examination. This plan was accepted by the Trial Chamber and its implementation does have serious positive effects.
During the Judges’ Plenary on 30 May, an amendment to the Rules was unfortunately adopted that would allow a Trial Chamber to direct the Prosecutor to cut counts in an indictment. In view of the checks and balances contained in the Statute, and particularly the duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor under the Statute, such directions by the Chambers can only be interpreted as purely advisory in nature. Only the Security Council has the power to modify the ICTY Statute, which guarantees the independence of the Prosecutor and assigns to her the responsibility of determining which charges to bring in a prosecution.
I am continuously reviewing our cases and I will not hesitate to cut counts when there are clear judicial reasons for that. It is however impossible to arbitrarily cut and slice cases, which are complex by their very nature. My mandate, given by the Security Council, is to prosecute the most senior officials, that is to say persons who were most often far removed from the crime scenes and whose responsibility can only be established by examining a number of different crimes, often in different geographical areas. Removing one or several counts artificially may seriously undermine the prosecution case. Eventually it leads to impunity for certain crimes and does not do justice to the victims, who are already puzzled by the Completion Strategy.
Allow me to use an example: Srebrenica. Which counts should I eliminate? Those referring to the killings of over 7,000 men and boys? (see:
preliminary list of 8,106 Srebrenica massacre victims) Or those relating to the forcible transfer of 25,000 women, children and elderly people? This would mean that I am only presenting half the picture of the serious crimes that took place in Srebrenica. How can I justify presenting only half the picture of the brutal crimes that took place in the former Yugoslavia? These are choices that, as a Prosecutor representing also the victims, I am not ready to make. This would introduce unacceptable disparity in the treatment of the persons accused by the Tribunal. There must be no justice à la carte.I will again urge the other organs of the Tribunal to focus on the proposals made by the Judges’s Working Group and by my Office. These measures, if fully implemented, would have a serious impact on the length of the proceedings and put the Tribunal closer to realizing the Completion Strategy.
Speeding up the proceedings is a top priority of my Office. Obtaining the arrest and transfer of the remaining indictees at large is another one. It has been said a thousand times: it is inconceivable that the ICTY closes its doors with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić at large.
I want to stress again before the Council that impunity for these two most serious architects of the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both accused of genocide, would represent a terrible blow not only to the success or failure of the Tribunal, but to the future of international justice as a whole.Serbia has the main responsibility to locate, arrest and transfer all six fugitives. According to my information, Mladić, Tolimir, Hadžić and Župljanin are in Serbia. Furthermore, there are established leads connecting Serbia to Karadžić, whose location is unknown, and to Ðjorđevic, who is still believed to be in Russia. The fact that Mladić has been an active officer of the Army of Yugoslavia till May 2002, one year and a half after the fall of Milosević and seven years after he was indicted, adds to the responsibility of Belgrade for its failure to deliver the former General.
Over the past twelve months, the Serbian authorities have repeatedly promised that Mladić would be delivered soon. I was told regularly by Serbian officials that the circle was closing down around him. At the end of April, in view of Serbia’s failure to achieve the promised results, I re-assessed the whole operation and found out that it had been suffering grave defects. During 2005, there was no real attempt to locate and arrest Mladić. Time was wasted in trying to encourage him to surrender voluntarily. Since the beginning of this year, it seems that more was undertaken. In particular, his support network was targeted, and several of his supporters arrested. These actions were sometimes spectacular, they fed many news articles, but they lacked the necessary discretion that would have allowed to acquire information leading to Mladić.
The most blatant dysfunction is the total lack of co-operation between the military and the civilian authorities. The inconsistencies I could identify in the various reports provided to me came as another surprise and forced me to suspect that some of the information contained in these reports had been doctored for political reasons. In our co-operation with Belgrade, we have not managed to achieve so far the level of trust and transparency that we had achieved with other countries. I will keep on engaging the Serbian Government in the months to come, trying to establish more confidence and a better communication.
As to the other aspects of the co-operation with Belgrade, a mission was sent in the second half of May to test the new arrangement agreed upon with the Government of Serbia and Montenegro regarding access to archives. This has been a long standing problem. The first accounts I received from my staff are encouraging.
To sum up, the co-operation provided by Serbia to the ICTY has been and remains very difficult and frustrating. There is serious political and administrative resistance within the system, and a strong political will is needed to overcome those obstacles. On the basis of the facts in my possession, I cannot be convinced that Serbia is ready to arrest Mladić. For a number of reasons, the authorities may still prefer to force him to surrender voluntarily.
Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina also has to increase substantially its efforts to locate and arrest fugitives. Whereas it is unclear whether Radovan Karadžić still resides at times or travels through Republika Srpska, it is certain that part of his network and of his family remains there. In the reporting period, the cooperation provided by Republika Srpska to my office has rather decreased, which is due to political reasons and the reshuffling of personnel in the police. Now that a new team is in place, the search for Karadžić must intensify rapidly.
My office has maintained a positive working relationship with Montenegro for over a year, and I expect this co-operation to continue at full speed. Part of Karadžić’s family is living in Montenegro, and he can count on numerous supporters there.
I am particularly disappointed about the lack of movement on another important fugitive, Vlastimir Ðjorđevic. The investigation carried out by the Russian authorities, as they told us, has failed to produce results. This will have negative implications on the completion strategy, because, if Ðjorđevic is not surrendered within the next weeks, it will be impossible to try him with his six co-accused. Resources will therefore have to be wasted in a separate trial. Ðjorđevic is accused of very serious crimes committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo. The long and unexplained delays in the transfer of Zelenović, who was detained in Russia since August 2005, do not allow for optimism in the future of the ICTY’s co-operation with the Russian Federation.
It is also worrying that a sister organisation of the Tribunal, the UN Mission in Kosovo, refuses to co-operate fully with the Tribunal. My office has nowadays more difficulties to access documents belonging to UNMIK than in any other place in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the UNMIK leadership is encouraging a climate which deters witnesses from talking to my investigators when it comes to the Albanian perpetrators. Very recently, there have been some indications that the UNMIK is willing to take a more constructive attitude in its relations with my office.
Mrs. President,
I explained at length in my last report why Karadžić and Mladić are still at large more than 10 years after they were first indicted. My assessment remains the same today. Serbia has to do much more to arrest and transfer Ratko Mladić. The arrest of Radovan Karadžić is a shared responsibility of Serbia, Republika Srpska, NATO and EUFOR. It is pathetic that today, nobody is searching actively for Karadžić. The planned downsizing of EUFOR will further aggravate the situation. Since no one else seems to have the political will to locate and arrest Karadzic and Mladić, I will have no choice but to seek from the Council the powers to arrest fugitives where ever they are and to allocate to my Office the necessary resources for this. Ultimately, I do not see any other way for the ICTY to fulfil its mandate and satisfy the legitimate expectations the victims placed into the United Nations.
BOSNIA OPENS SREBRENICA GENOCIDE TRIAL
Bosnia war crimes court opens first genocide trial
“The prosecution will ask the court to declare these men guilty so that a small step towards meeting justice can be made,” Bulic said in his introductory remarks.Related links:
ICTY: SERBS RESPONSIBLE FOR 1994 SARAJEVO MARKALE MASSACRE
Milosevic Trial – The Hague – Court Room One
Day 273, 16 January 2004.
Bosnian Serbs Responsible for Sarajevo Markale Massacre, Expert Testifies
Update:
Serb General, Stanislav Galic, guilty for 1994 Sarajevo Markale Market MassacreBy: Judith Armatta
THE HAGUE – Berko Zecevic, an expert in designing ammunition who investigated the mortar shell that killed 68 and wounded 144 in Sarajevo’s Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994, concluded that the shell could only have come from the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) positions. His conclusion was presented in a report commissioned by the Office of the Prosecutor and introduced into evidence when he appeared in Court today.
The source of the 120 millimeter mortar shell that exploded in the middle of the busy market has been a matter of serious contention since it occurred. Initially, members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said the shell was fired from Bosnian Government positions. From that, some concluded that the Bosnian Government was firing on its own people, to make it appear they were victims of Bosnian Serb aggression and gain international sympathy and, ultimately, international intervention on their behalf. A later, more indepth UNPROFOR report, however, noted a calculation error in the first UN report. Correcting the error led the UN to conclude that it was impossible to say which side had fired the shell.
Mr. Zecevic testified that, when he heard on television that authorities were unable to determine the source of the projectile, he offered his services as an expert to the judge investigating the incident. Working with two colleagues, their analysis revealed the direction from which the shell was fired and six possible locations from which it could have been fired (5 under VRS control and 1 under ABH (Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) control). The site under ABH control was clearly visible to UNPROFOR personnel, who reported that no shell was fired from that position. The type of stabilizer fin (part of the projectile) found at the site was produced in one of two places, both under control of the VRS at the time. As a result of this and other technical measurements, Mr. Zecevic concluded the shell could only have come from one of the positions under VRS control.
While Mr. Zecevic’s experience and expertise in ammunition design and testing was impressive, the Accused questioned his objectivity based on his having worked for the ABH until shortly before the massacre. Mr. Zecevic insisted he conducted a professional and objective analysis, which was fully supported by facts and calculations that could be checked by any expert in the field. He added that his assistance to the ABH ended in July of the previous year. Before that, he worked for 17 years in the Research and Development Section of a major munitions factory in Bosnia. The factory was part of the former federal Yugoslavia’s interdependent military-industrial complex. When the JNA dissolved, the system was reorganized and Mr. Zecevic left.
An earlier witness, former UN officer David Howland, told the Court that UN investigations could not determine the source of the particular shell that exploded in the Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994, but UN records showed that almost 100% of shells landing on the ABH side of the confrontation line were fired by the VRS. He also testified that, while the BHA sometimes provoked fire at civilian targets, it did not fire on its own people (the citizens of Sarajevo of all ethnicities).
During his cross examination, Milosevic read out a portion of the dissenting opinion in the Galic trial, where Judge Nieto-Navia concluded that the prosecution in that case had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb forces were responsible for the shell that exploded in the Markale Marketplace on February 5, 1994. He found support for his conclusion in the Special UN Team’s official findings communicated to the UN Security Council that “there is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party fired the mortar bomb.” As Judge May noted, that is one judge’s view and nothing more. He might also have pointed out that the majority in the Galic case found beyond a reasonable doubt that the shell was deliberately fired from VRS-controlled territory, after extensively reviewing expert opinions, including Mr. Zecevic’s and the UN’s, as well as eye witness evidence.
The conclusions in the Galic trial are not binding on the judges in the Milosevic trial. Here, as there, the judges will have to make a thorough review and analysis of all evidence submitted — by both the Prosecution and Defence — before making up their own minds. The question remains whether the matter will ever be finally resolved.
Mr. Zecevic also provided expert testimony that the source of significant quantities and types of ammunition used by the VRS against the citizens of Sarajevo came from Serbia. His conclusion was based on an analysis of unexploded ordnance in Sarajevo. The Prosecution produced numerous documents, showing that Mr. Zecevic’s former factory, military production enterprises in Serbia, the JNA/VJ and the VRS/RS took over and adapted the former federal Yugoslav military production network. Under it, as a number of the documents showed, Serbia and the JNA and its successor the VJ supplied weapons, ammunition and needed raw materials to the Bosnian Serbs. This practice violated the UN arms embargo. And, as Mr. Zecevic told the Court, “[I]t means that the country [Serbia/FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] was directly taking part in the killing of people who were unarmed,” i.e. the citizens of Sarajevo where the unexploded ordnance was found. The documents, together with Mr. Zecevic’s testimony, add yet more corroboration that Serbia was supporting the war by the RS against the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Prosecution has long since succeeded in establishing that Serbia supplied the Bosnian Serbs with significant quantities of weapons and military equipment without which they could not have waged war. Milosevic faces a formidable task to discredit this evidence.
keywords: ICTY, International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Berko Zecevic, UNPROFOR, Sarajevo Markale Marketplace Massacre, Markale Marketplace Massacre Sarajevo, Sarajevo Markale Massacre, Markale Massacre, Markale Sarajevo Massacre, Srebrenica Genocide, Srebrenica Massacre, Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia-Herzegovina
UN REPORT: THE FALL OF SREBRENICA – ROLE OF BOSNIAK FORCES ON THE GROUND
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session, Agenda item 42
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 November 1999, pages 103-104
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35
475. Criticisms have also been leveled at the Bosniaks in Srebrenica, among them that they did not fully demilitarize and that they did not do enough to defend the enclave. To a degree, these criticisms appear to be contradictory. Concerning the first criticism, it is right to note that the Bosnian Government had entered into demilitarization agreements with the Bosnian Serbs. They did this with the encouragement of the United Nations. While it is also true that the Bosnian fighters in Srebrenica did not fully demilitarize, they did demilitarize enough for UNPROFOR to issue a press release, on 21 April 1993, saying that the process had been a success. Specific instructions from United Nations Headquarters in New York stated that UNPROFOF should not be too zealous in searching for Bosniak weapons and, later, that the Serbs should withdraw their heavy weapons before the Bosniaks gave up their weapons. The Serbs never did withdraw their heavy weapons.
476. Concerning the accusation that the Bosniaks did not do enough to defend Srebrenica, military experts consulted in connection with this report were largely in agreement that the Bosniaks could not have defended Srebrenica for long in the face of a concerted attack supported by armour and artillery. The defenders were undisciplined, untrained, poorly armed, totally isolated force, lying prone in the crowded valley of Srebrenica. They were ill-equipped even to train themselves in the use of the few heavier weapons that had been smuggled to them by their authorities. After over three years of siege, the population was demoralized, afraid and often hungry. The only leader of stature was absent when the attack occurred. Surrounding them, controlling all the high ground, handsomely equipped with the heavy weapons and logistical train of the Yugoslav army, were the Bosnian Serbs. There was no contest.
477. Despite the odds against them, the Bosniaks requested UNPROFOR to return to them the weapons they had surrendered under the demilitarization agreements of 1993. They requested those weapons at the beginning of the Serb offensive, but the request was rejected by the UNPROFOR because, as one commander explained, “it was our responsibility to defend the enclave, not theirs.” Given the limited number and poor quality of Bosniak weapons held by UNPROFOR, it seems unlikely that releasing those weapons to the Bosniaks would have made a significant difference to the outcome of the battle; but the Bosniaks were under attack at that time, they wanted to resist with whatever means they could muster, and UNPROFOR denied them access to some of their own weapons. With the benefit of hindsight, this decision seems to be particularly ill-advised, given UNPROFOR’s own unwillingness consistently to advocate force as a means deterring attacks on the enclave.
478. Many have accused the Bosniak forces of withdrawing from the enclave as the Serb forces advanced on the day of its fall. However, it must be remembered that on the eve of the final Serb assault the Dutchbat commander urged the Bosniaks to withdraw from defensive positions south of Srebrenica town – the direction from which the Serbs were advancing. He did so because he believed that NATO aircraft would soon be launching widespread air strikes against the advancing Serbs.
479. A third accusation leveled at the Bosniak defenders of Srebrenica is that they provoked the Serb offensive by attacking out of that safe area. Even though this accusation is often repeated by international sources, there is no credible evidence to support it. Dutchbat personnel on the ground at the time assessed that the few “raids” the Bosniaks mounted out of Srebrenica were of little or no military significance. These raids were often organized in order to gather food, as the Serbs had refused access for humanitarian convoys into the enclave. Even Serb sources approached in the context of this report acknowledged that the Bosniak forces in Srebrenica posed no significant military threat to them. The biggest attack the Bosniaks launched out of Srebrenica during the more than two years which is was designated a safe area appears to have been the raid on the village of Visnjica, on 26 June 1995, in which several houses were burned, up to four Serbs were killed and approximately 100 sheep were stolen. In contrast, the Serbs overran the enclave two weeks later, driving tens of thousands from their homes, and summarily executing thousands of men and boys. The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the raids out of Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to create geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the Drina, while freeing their troops to fight in other parts of the country. The extent to which this pretext was accepted at face value by international actors and observers reflected the prism of “moral equivalency” through which the conflict in Bosnia was viewed by too many for too long.
Srebrenica Massacre 